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ABSTRACT 
 
With the fast development of communication systems, network security issues have 
more and more impact on daily life. It is essential to construct a high degree of optical 
layer security to resolve the security problem once and for all. 
 
Three different techniques which can provide optical layer security are introduced 
and compared. Optical chaos can be used for fast random number generation. Quantum 
cryptography is the most promising technique for key distribution. And the optical 
coding techniques can be deployed to encrypt the modulated signal in the optical layer. 
 
A mathematical equation has been derived from information theory to evaluate the 
information-theoretic security level of the wiretap channel in optical coding schemes. 
And the merits and limitation of two coherent optical coding schemes, temporal phase 
coding and spectral phase coding, have been analysed. 
 
The security scheme based on a reconfigurable optical coding device has been 
introduced, and the corresponding security protocol has been developed. By moving the 
encryption operation from the electronic layer to the optical layer, the modulated signals 
become opaque to the unauthorised users. 
 
Optical code distribution and authentication is the one of the major challenges for 
our proposed scheme. In our proposed protocol, both of the operations are covered and 
defined in detail. As a preliminary draft of the optical code security protocol, it could be 
a useful guidance for further research. 
  
 ii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Aiguo Wang and Xinlian Zhang. Their continued 
support enabled the hours of research, contemplation, and writing necessary to 
complete this project. Words are just not expressive enough for their everlasting love. 
 
This thesis is also in debt to Dr. Xu Wang, a mentor who showed great patience on me 
and who guided me to see the importance of working with consistency. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my friend, Yuxin Zhao, without her encouragement on the 
hardest moment, this thesis wouldn’t have been possible to make. 
  
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to gratefully acknowledge the guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Xu 
Wang, who has been abundantly helpful and has assisted me in numerous ways. I 
specially thank him for his infinite patience. The discussions I had with him were 
invaluable. 
 
I would like to say a big thanks to my colleagues, Dr. Zhensen Gao, Dr. Bo Dai, Dr. 
Mumtaz Ali and Mr. Yu Liang. We had a good time together with lots of valuable 
discussions. Their ideas and solid working on the related subjects inspired me a lot. 
 
I am particularly thankful for my friend, Yuxin Zhao, for her help and encouraging 
me to pursue my postgraduate studies. 
 
Many thanks are due to all my friends for their support and kindness. 
 
Last but not least, I would like to appreciate my family, especially my parents, for 
giving me their great love and support. 
  
 iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... i 
DEDICATION .......................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................... iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................. viii 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. ix 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................. xi 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS BY THE CANDIDATE ............................................ xiii 
Chapter 1   Introduction ............................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Information Security ................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Elements of information security ............................................................. 2 
1.1.2 The hierarchy of network security techniques ......................................... 3 
1.1.3 The conceptual model of communication network and network security 4 
1.2 Network Security Threats ........................................................................... 6 
1.2.1 Packet Sniffing and Eavesdropping ........................................................ 7 
1.2.2 Denial of Service and Jamming ............................................................... 8 
1.2.3 Spoofing and Man-in-the-middle attacks ................................................ 8 
1.2.4 Viruses, Malwares and Trojans ............................................................... 9 
1.3 Examples of security approaches ................................................................ 9 
1.3.1 HTTPS based on SSL/TLS ..................................................................... 10 
1.3.2 Security architecture in UMTS mobile network .................................... 13 
1.3.3 Wireless local area network security .................................................... 15 
1.3.4 IPsec ...................................................................................................... 19 
1.4 Physical layer security............................................................................... 21 
1.4.1 Shannon’s information-theoretic secrecy theory .................................. 22 
 v 
 
1.4.2 PLS in wireless communications ........................................................... 24 
1.4.3 PLS in optical networks ......................................................................... 26 
1.5 Objectives and outlines ............................................................................. 27 
Chapter 2   Communication Security Approaches in the Optical Layer ................. 29 
2.1 Optical Chaos ............................................................................................ 29 
2.1.1 Data modulation based on nonlinear dynamics .................................... 30 
2.1.2 Pseudo-random sequence generation from chaotic laser ..................... 34 
2.2 Quantum Key Distribution ........................................................................ 35 
2.2.1 Security in No-Cloning Theorem ........................................................... 36 
2.2.2 Security in Entanglement ....................................................................... 37 
2.2.3 Security in Quantum Fluctuation .......................................................... 38 
2.2.4 Challenge from Practicality .................................................................. 38 
2.3 Optical Coding Techniques ....................................................................... 39 
2.3.1 Temporal Phase Coding ........................................................................ 40 
2.3.2 Spectral Phase Coding .......................................................................... 41 
2.4 Brief Summary .......................................................................................... 43 
Chapter 3   Security Performance Analysis for Optical Coding Techniques .......... 45 
3.1 General wiretap channel ............................................................................ 45 
3.2 Temporal Phase Coding ............................................................................ 46 
3.2.1 Code Space Limitation .......................................................................... 46 
3.2.2 Information-theoretic security ............................................................... 48 
3.3 Spectral Phase Coding............................................................................... 51 
3.3.1 Code Space Limitation .......................................................................... 51 
3.3.2 Information-theoretic Security .............................................................. 53 
3.4 Reconfigurable Coding Device ................................................................. 54 
Chapter 4   Optical Code Security Protocol for Dynamic Optical Code Link 
Initiation .......................................................................................................................... 58 
4.1 Optical Code Security Protocol in Optical Communication System ........ 58 
 vi 
 
4.1.1 Basic Point-to-Point Transmission ....................................................... 59 
4.1.2 Packet Switching Network ..................................................................... 61 
4.1.3 Discussion of Compatibility .................................................................. 62 
4.1.4 Modularity and General Procedure ...................................................... 62 
4.2 Consideration of the Secured Optical Code Link Initiation ...................... 67 
4.2.1 Features of Optical Code Link .............................................................. 67 
4.2.2 Shared Secret and Optical Code Generation ........................................ 68 
4.2.3 Authentication ....................................................................................... 72 
4.2.4 Integrity Checksum ................................................................................ 74 
4.2.5 OC Link Renewal and Lifetime of the OC ............................................. 74 
4.2.6 Packet Routing and Preamble Synchronization .................................... 75 
4.2.7 Packet Sequence, Nonces and Optical Code Link ID............................ 76 
4.2.8 Retransmission ...................................................................................... 77 
4.3 Definition of Data Formats in OCSP ........................................................ 78 
4.3.1 Optical Code Link Header..................................................................... 78 
4.3.2 Module Header ...................................................................................... 80 
4.3.3 Optical Code Link Module .................................................................... 80 
4.3.4 Diffie-Hellman Exchange Module ......................................................... 81 
4.3.5 Authentication Module .......................................................................... 82 
4.3.6 Integrity Checking Module .................................................................... 83 
4.3.7 Data Transmission Module ................................................................... 84 
4.3.8 OC Link Renewal Module ..................................................................... 84 
4.3.9 D-H Exchange Segment ......................................................................... 85 
4.3.10 ID Segment ............................................................................................ 85 
4.3.11 Nonce Segment ...................................................................................... 86 
4.4 Security Consideration from Cryptanalysis Perspective ........................... 86 
4.4.1 Ciphertext-only Attack: Parallel Exhaustive OC Searching ................. 87 
4.4.2 Ciphertext-only Attack: Differential Analysis ....................................... 88 
 vii 
 
4.4.3 Known Plaintext Attack: Phase Shifts Detection................................... 88 
4.4.4 Chosen Plaintext Attack: Reconstruct the Transfer Function ............... 90 
Chapter 5   Conclusion and Future Work ................................................................ 92 
References ............................................................................................................... 93 
 
 
  
 viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1   Network security threats classification …………………………………….. 6 
Table 1.2    Security features in UMTS security architecture ………………………... 14 
Table 1.3    Encryption algorithms in UMTS ………………………………………… 15 
Table 1.4    Security framework of 802.11i  …………………………………………...16 
Table 1.5    RSN information element format………………………………………...  19 
Table 2.1  Comparison between optical chaos, quantum cryptography and optical 
coding techniques …………………………………………………………………….  44 
Table 4.1   Clarification of the terms ………………………………………………….59 
Table 4.2   Comparison of different optical buffer approaches ………………………. 61 
Table 4.3   The relative key length of different D-H groups  ………………………….69 
  
 ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1   CIA triad and the onion model for information security……………………2 
Figure 1.2   The hierarchy of network security techniques  …………………………….4 
Figure 1.3   Security in network layering model  ……………………………………….5 
Figure 1.4   An example of TLS 1.2 handshake  ………………………………………11 
Figure 1.5   Data encryption process under TLS 1.2 protocol  ………………………...12 
Figure 1.6   4-way handshake and group key handshake …………………………….. 17 
Figure 1.7   RSN establishment procedure …………………………………………… 18 
Figure 1.8.  AH format according to RFC 4302 ……………………………………… 20 
Figure 1.9   Top-level format of an ESP packet ……………………………………… 20 
Figure 1.10 The simplest transmission model………………………………………… 22 
Figure 2.1   Schematic diagram of chaos shift keying………………………………..  30 
Figure 2.2   Schematic diagram of chaos masking …………………………………...  30 
Figure 2.3   Schematic diagram of chaos modulation………………………………...  31 
Figure 2.4  Decoded signals of chaos shift keying (CSK), chaos masking (CMS) and 
additive chaos modulation (ACM) …………………………………………………… 32 
Figure 2.5   Performance comparisons of chaos shift keying (CSK), chaos masking 
(CMS) and additive chaos modulation (ACM) ………………………………………. 33 
Figure 2.6   Concept of random number generation with chaotic lasers……………...  34 
Figure 2.7   An example of QKD in BB84 …………………………………………… 37 
Figure 2.8   An example of QKD in E91 ……………………………………………... 37 
Figure 2.9   An example of QKD in Y-00 ……………………………………………. 38 
Figure 2.10  The schematic diagram of TPC encoding/decoding process …………… 40 
Figure 2.11  Basic Principle of SPC Encoding Process ……………………………...  42 
Figure 3.1   General wiretap channel for optical coding schemes  …………………… 45 
Figure 3.2   Code space limitation of temporal phase coding (tp=20fs) ……………..  47 
Figure 3.3   Partially decoding of TPC scheme ………………………………………  48 
Figure 3.4   Examples of different modulation formats of TPC schemes…………….. 48 
Figure 3.5   Eavesdropping structure of TPC schemes……………………………….   49 
Figure 3.6   Example of partially decoding for SPC scheme ………………………….52 
Figure 3.7   The power distribution of partially decoding in SPC……………………..53 
Figure 3.8   Principle of reconfigurable spectral phase coding device   ..…………55 
Figure 3.9   Experimental setup of the 40 Gb/s secure optical communication system 
based on reconfigurable coding device   ……………………………..………………56 
 x 
 
Figure 4.1   The position of the OC link in the TCP/IP network model for the point-to-
point scenario …………………………………………………………………………. 60 
Figure 4.2   OCSP system schematic diagram ………………………………………... 61 
Figure 4.3   The position of the OC link in the packet switching (IP) network  ………61 
Figure 4.4   Functioning modules in OCSP…………………………………………..  63 
Figure 4.5   General procedure of OCSP …………………………………………….. 65 
Figure 4.6   Message exchanges in OCSP for OC link initiation……………………..  66 
Figure 4.7   Man-in-the-Middle attack against the first exchange ……………………. 67 
Figure 4.8   The process of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange ……………………….. 70 
Figure 4.9   Key material generation …………………………………………………. 70 
Figure 4.10  The identity authentication procedures …………………………………. 73 
Figure 4.11  Packet routing label and preamble synchronization signals ……………. 76 
Figure 4.12  Schematic diagram of packet synchronization ………………………….. 76 
Figure 4.13  Format of the OC link header …………………………………………… 78 
Figure 4.14  Format of the module header ………………………………………….. 80 
Figure 4.15  Format of the OC link module …………………………………………...80 
Figure 4.16  Format of the D-H exchange module …………………………………. 81 
Figure 4.17  Format of the CERTReq segment …………………………………….. 82 
Figure 4.18  Format of the CERT segment …………………………………………. 82 
Figure 4.19  Format of the IC segment ……………………………………………… 83 
Figure 4.20  Format of the data transmission module ………………………………. 83 
Figure 4.21  Format of the OC link renewal module ……………………………….. 84 
Figure 4.22  Format of the D-H segment …………………………………………… 85 
Figure 4.23  Format of the ID segment ……………………………………………... 85 
Figure 4.24  Format of the Nonce segment………………………………………….  86 
Figure 4.25  Parallel exhaustive OC searching ……………………………………….. 87 
Figure 4.26  Schematic of a simple differential detector ……………………………... 88 
Figure 4.27  Weakness of the simple XOR encryption……………………………...  89 
Figure 4.28  Potential threats when reusing OC with limited length ………………… 90 
 
  
 xi 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
3GPP 3rd generation partnership project 
AEAD Authenticated encryption with associated data  
AES Advanced encryptionstandard 
AES Advanced encryption algorithm 
AH Authentication header 
AKA Authentication and key agreement 
CCMP Counter mode cipher block chaining message authentication code protocol 
CDMA Code division multiplexing acess 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availabitliy 
CSI Channel state information  
CSK Code shift keying 
DES Data encryption standard 
D-H Diffie-Hellman exchange 
DoS Denial of service 
DSA Digital signature algorithm 
DSS Direct sequence spread  
EAP Extensible authentication protocol  
ESP Encapsulating payload 
FH Frequency hopping  
HDR Header 
HTTPS Hypertext transfer protocol secure 
ID Identity 
IPsec Internet protocol security 
ISO International standards organization 
LAI Location area identification 
LTE Long term evolution 
MAC Message authentication code 
 xii 
 
MD5 Message digest 5 
MIC Message integrity code  
OC Optical code 
OCSP Optical code security protocol 
OFDM Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing 
OOK On-off keying 
PKI Public key infrastructure 
PMK Pairwise master key 
PRBS Pseudo-random bit sequence  
PRF Pseudo-random function 
PTK Pairwise transient key  
QKD Quantum key distrbution 
RAI Routing area identification  
RC4 Rivest cipher 4 
RFC Request for comments  
RSN Robust security network 
SA Security associations  
SHA1 Secure hash algorithm 1 
SPC Spectral phase coding 
SSL Secure sockets layer 
TDSS Time domain spectral shaping  
TKIP Temporal key integrity protocol  
TLS Transport layer security 
TPC Temporal phase coding 
UMTS Universal mobile telecommunication system  
VLR Visited location register  
WEP Wired equivalent privacy  
 xiii 
 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS BY THE CANDIDATE 
 
[1]   X. Wang, Z. Gao, B. Dai, X. H. Wang, N. Kataoka, and N. Wada, “Fast optical 
code reconfigurable technique for secure optical communication”, (Invited) 13th 
International Conference on Transparent Optical Networks (ICTON 2011), Sweden, 
July, 2011, Paper We. B1. 4. 
 
[2]   X. Wang, Z. Gao, X. H. Wang, N. Kataoka and N. Wada, “Bit-by-bit optical code 
scrambling technique for secure optical communication”, Optics Express, Vol. 19 Issue 
4, pp. 3503–3512 (2011). 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
As the network become more and more important in everyone’s daily life, the 
security of the network draws increasing interest from the government to the public. In 
2013, the PRISM program has been revealed by Snowden in Hong-Kong, which is 
considered as a big crisis in information privacy. The case shows the importance of the 
network security in many ways [1]. And in 2014, the world’s largest and most popular 
mobile device provider – Apple involved in several data leakage cases, from user device 
ID (which can be used to track the phone user) to the data stored in iCloud. These big 
events remind us constantly of the importance of the network security [2]. 
 
The security of communication networks involves a fairly wide range of topics 
from system design, hardware and software implementation to the management, media 
and human behaviour etc. In spite of the fact that the network security has a very broad 
definition and the security requirement always varies for different networks, the 
ultimate objective is to protect the data safe, no matter what types of network we are in, 
how we configure our computer and firewall, patch our system, apply what kind of 
encryptions and security protocols. In other word, information security is the core of 
network security. 
 
1.1 Information Security 
 
The information security is always an issue about the balance under a certain 
amount of resources. Even when we start to define the scope of information security, a 
compromise has been made between the system complexity and security. Therefore, 
knowing the value of the information we are going to protect is quite important while 
developing a security strategy. Although in traditional cryptography, we always assume 
that the adversary has unlimited resources, it becomes unrealistic when the cost of 
hacking is higher than the value of the information. 
 
In this section, the background of the information security is introduced, including 
the techniques used in the current security applications in communication networks. 
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1.1.1 Elements of information security 
 
The general consideration of information security consists of three aspects: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, which are often referred as CIA Triad by the 
definition from International Standards Organization (ISO) [3], as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
Confidentiality keeps the privacy of the data. It is the protection on the information 
from unauthorized access. 
 
Integrity ensures the protected data cannot be modified or damaged by 
unauthorized parties, and if the modification on data (by authorized users) is unexpected, 
the original data can be recovered. 
 
Availability refers to the data should be accessible by the demands of authorized 
entities. Either the access channels or the authentication mechanisms must be working 
properly when needed. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 CIA triad and the onion model for information security. 
 
The major concern of the CIA Triad is about the information security. And the 
concept of CIA Triad is continued being debated amongst security professionals. As a 
starting point of pursuing security, more and more considerations have been proposed 
and added into the original model, such as: 
 
Authentication, which ensures both entities involved in the communication are who 
they claim to be. 
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Non-repudiation, which prevents the entities involved in communication denying 
the information transmission. The concept is original from the electronic commerce. 
 
Accountability, which records and traces the behaviours of specific users. 
 
It is important to note that although the considerations of the security are increasing, 
not all the elements are necessary at the same time. The development of the security 
service is always a result of needs. One thing is certain that each security technique 
always has its own limitations, and any formalized framework should never be treated 
as the end but the beginning to the new security approaches. 
 
1.1.2 The hierarchy of network security techniques 
 
The network security involves the techniques from many areas including, but not 
limited to, cryptography, network protocols, information theory, coding, switch and 
router, transmitter and receiver etc. In order to organize them in a structured map, it is 
convenience to categorize the technologies by their functionalities as below: 
 
Elemental techniques: these techniques are primarily designed to fulfil one of the 
security elements. As the basic security measures, these techniques could be combined 
with each other or adopted by higher level implementations. The techniques are usually 
manipulated by system designer, and are not always known by the individual users. 
 
Integrated techniques: these techniques are developed from one or more elemental 
techniques, and are designed to fulfil certain security requirements. These techniques 
are user oriented and usually can be used by any individual users directly. 
 
Security Architectures: these techniques are independent security solutions, which 
contain bunch of lower level techniques and can be used as a security guidance or 
standard. 
 
An example of the categorization is shown in Figure 1.2. Although not all the 
techniques could fit in the categorization perfectly, it is still very helpful when we 
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realized the functional level of each security techniques. It will provide us with a better 
understanding on how these techniques operate together or compete with each other. 
 
Figure 1.2 The hierarchy of network security techniques. 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2, the elemental techniques in the same group have similar roles. 
For example, Data Encryption Standard (DES) [4], Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) [5] and Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) are symmetric encryption algorithms and can be 
used as the options for data encryption. While the RSA [6] and Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA) [7] are asymmetric encryption algorithms which can be used to 
encrypt or to verify a digital signature. Message Digest Algorithm (MD5) [8] and 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA1) [9] are used to verify the integrity of the data. The 
integrated techniques consist of several elemental techniques. For instance, Internet 
Protocol Security (IPsec) adopts DES and AES for Encapsulating Security Payload 
encryption, SHA1 and AES for integrity verification, Diffie-Hellman group for secret 
key distribution [10]. Similarly, for different network environments, different elemental 
techniques may be selected to optimize the system performance. 
 
1.1.3 The conceptual model of communication network and network security 
 
Traditionally, the communication networks are divided into two broad types: One 
provides only unidirectional downstream capacity to diffuse information, which is 
referred as broadcasting network, and the other provides bidirectional upstream and 
downstream channels, which is referred as telecommunication networks. 
 
Elemental
Confidentiality
Techniques
Elemental
Integrity
Techniques
Elemental
Authorization
Techniques
Elemental
Authentication
Techniques
…
Symmetric Key – DES/AES/RC4
Public Key – RSA/DSA
Key Exchange – Diffi-Hellman
Key-Agreement Protocol
Access Control –
UserID and Password
Access Control Lists
Packet Filtering
Authentication Header
Encapsulating Security Payload
Digital Signature
VPN - IPSec/SSL/TLS/PEAP
Remote Access Architecture PKI Architecture WLAN Security Architecture IEEE 802.11
Hashing –
MD5/SHA1
Integrated
Security Architectures
Single Sign On Firewalls
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With the rapid growth of the internet, the distinctions between broadcasting 
network and telecommunication network are converging. According to the research 
report on Science magazine [11], one fourth of broadcasting network had been 
digitalized by 2007. And the information transmitted on the Internet has accounted for 
97% over the total amount of information exchange. 
 
Meanwhile, there are still several types of communication networks working 
independently, such as the Internet, public switched telephone networks, mobile 
networks, global telex networks and interbank networks, as well as the private networks 
maintained by organizations, enterprises, universities and institutions that might not 
tend to open their resources to public access. 
 
Since the services provided by these networks are different, the security 
requirements are also vary from one to another. To understand how the security 
techniques function in these networks, it is better to introduce a general model of 
communication networks. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Network security and the network model. 
 
Figure 1.3 shows the OSI model and the TCP/IP model of communication 
networks. The blue arrows indicate the data movement in the transmission. The data 
from various applications are encapsulated in the format of TCP/UDP packet in the 
transport layer. Then the packet is further encapsulated with an IP header to form an IP 
packet. The IP packets are further encapsulated into the format that is suitable for 
transmission on the channels which are defined according to the different physical 
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protocols, such as Ethernet, ATM, SONET, GSM and CDMA etc. At each network 
node, the IP header needs to be extracted for the purpose of routing the data packet to its 
destination. Similarly, the IP data packet is transparent to the node by the default 
TCP/IP protocols. Thus in order to keep the data packet safe, either secure physical 
protocols or the upper layer encryption is required. For the individuals without the 
knowledge of the network infrastructure, upper layer encryptions are the only choice for 
security purpose. Although the upper layer encryption may provide an end-to-end 
security, the obscurity of the data may cause compatibility problems in the bottom 
layers. In this case the network operators have to use the security approaches in the link 
layer/physical layer. Besides, elimination of the unnecessary O-E/E-O conversions will 
increase the throughput of the network significantly. 
 
1.2 Network Security Threats 
 
In this section, several common security threats in communication networks are 
introduced. These threats can be basically classified into two categories: passive attacks 
and active attacks, as shown in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1 Network security threats classification. 
Network Security Threats 
Passive attacks Active attacks 
Sniffing Denial-of-service attack 
Eavesdropping Spoofing 
Passively Trojan Man-in-the-middle attack 
 
Generally, the objective of passive attacks is to collect the data information without 
the awareness of the legitimate user, for example, sniffing, eavesdropping, and even the 
passive Trojan. These operations do not disrupt the network operations or services, thus 
are usually difficult to be detected. However, as the nature of the passive attacks, these 
operations are usually aimless. The attacker cannot choose the objectives he wants to 
attack or the information he wants to collect, he needs to maintain the attack alive until 
the objective appears with targeted information. 
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On the other hand, active attacks usually cause an influence on normal network 
operations and services. One of the ultimate objectives of active attacks is to disrupt the 
network or the service temporarily. The other is to modify the information to deceive 
the users of the network or the service. Due to the interference caused by the attackers, 
active attacks are usually traceable and detectable. Hence the active attacks are only 
used for breaching the specific targets and services in an unpredictable way to avoid 
being countered. 
 
1.2.1 Packet Sniffing and Eavesdropping 
 
Packet sniffing is defined as the operations that monitor the network data flow and 
collect useful information. It can be used either in positive way or negative way. In fact, 
all the telecommunication service providers use sniffing techniques to monitor the 
traffic and locate the potential threats of the network, especially against Denial-of-
service attack. The technique makes the traffic accountable. However, in a broadcasting 
network, such as Ethernet, all the packets are sent to every device in the network. In 
such network, it is easier for the attacker to capture all data packets by setting his/her 
Ethernet adapter to the promiscuous mode. Therefore, all the data without encryption is 
at the risk of exposure. There are several popular services such as telnet, FTP and POP3 
that transmit the usernames and passwords in plain text. Such defects of the protocols 
cause severe security vulnerability in Ethernet. Since the sniffing is operated in the data-
link layer, the current solution is to encrypt the data in the upper layers. 
 
While the packet sniffing is usually operated at the nodes of the network, 
eavesdropping is the technique to listen the traffic secretly from the transmission media. 
The threat is considered as a physical layer attack. Another difference between sniffing 
and eavesdropping is the environment: sniffing can be applied when the network 
protocol is known to the attacker, so that he can use the related device to extract data; 
whereas the eavesdropping can be used to intercept the transmitted signals, no matter 
what the data format is, and the result can be further used for cryptanalysis. Increase the 
data confidentiality is the best way against packet sniffing and eavesdropping, while the 
physical access to the network nodes and links should be in control. 
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1.2.2 Denial of Service and Jamming 
 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is one of the simplest forms of network attack. 
Instead of trying to steal the information, the DoS attack simply disrupts the information 
services by exhausting the resources available to the legitimate users. Since the server is 
usually stronger than the personal terminals, a successful DoS attack technically 
requires the attacker to have the ability to control a large amount of terminals to perform 
the attacks in the same time. DoS attacks are usually considered as an application layer 
attack, since most of system flaws leading to DoS attack are tied to a certain program or 
service, and can be removed after software upgrading. 
 
While DoS attacks are initiated to exhaust the resources of the service server, 
jamming is the technique to use up the bandwidth of the communication channels, 
hence is considered as a physical layer attack. Since the jamming signals are supposed 
to occupy all the channels of the network, the energy consumption of the attacks are 
remarkable and thus easily to be located. Although both the DoS attack and jamming 
are not the attacks in smart way, they do cause destructive influence: imagine the 
scenarios that the services of stock exchange or the World Cup are interrupted, or even 
worse in the case that a natural disaster happens while the entire communication 
network is jammed by the terrorist, the loss could be countless. 
 
1.2.3 Spoofing and Man-in-the-middle attacks 
 
Spoofing attack is the situation that an intruder successfully masquerades as a 
legitimate user by altering the transmitted data. Since many protocols in TCP/IP suite 
do not provide authentication mechanisms, the most common spoofing attack is IP 
spoofing. The destination of the packets is redirected by the attacker through the 
technique that falsifies the IP address. IP spoofing can be also used for good purpose, 
for example virtual users could be simulated by IP spoofing when the service requires a 
multi-user circumstance. 
 
Man-in-the-middle-attack is the attack that the attacker directly relays or modified 
the content of the message on purpose without being aware between two parties who 
believe they are communicating with each other. The attack can be performed by the 
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clients and applications which are used by both of the parties but owned by the third 
party. Also the attack can be achieved by physically access a node between two 
communicating parties, such as the routers or the switches. Compared to eavesdropping, 
the man-in-the middle attack intercept all of the message exchanges between the two 
targets and has the ability to alter or even inject the new ones. 
 
To prevent the spoofing and man-in-the-middle attack, the mutual authentication is 
required, which indicates both of the parties in the communication are real and as the 
ones they claim to be. 
 
1.2.4 Viruses, Malwares and Trojans 
 
Although viruses, malwares and Trojans are usually categorized to the computer 
security, they can also be used for cause the flaws in communication. As the most 
common attacks are targeted to the personal users, the impact of them can be controlled 
by the well-defined system rules. For example, make sure the users who don’t have 
enough security awareness can only have limited authorities to the system. Since the 
viruses, malwares and Trojans are spread by exploiting system defects and inappropriate 
operations, it is suggested that only trust-worthy system and open-source software are 
used to avoid the threats comes from the application itself. 
 
1.3 Examples of security approaches 
 
In this section, several security measures undertaking in current communication 
networks are introduced. By studying these examples, it is easier to form a 
comprehensive understanding on the topic of security issues in practical security 
systems. 
 
The first example is the Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) 
protocol. The protocol is widely used in web security applications and is supported by 
most of the web browsers. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol, 
which is popularly deployed on the Internet, is based on SSL/TLS protocol. It is used to 
secure the email services and the payment transactions on the web. At present, all types 
of websites use it for account managements. 
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The second example is the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
security architecture used in the “third generation” mobile cellular communication 
systems. It is derived from the “second generation” Global System for Mobile 
communications (GSM) system. 
 
The third example is the 802.11i protocol, which is used to secure the wireless 
local area network (WLAN). Technically, WLAN is more susceptible to eavesdropping 
than wired network. Hence in the development of WLAN security, the protocol includes 
not only the strong encryption and authentication, but also a high level access control. 
 
The last example is the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol, which is an 
end-to-end security scheme operating in the internet layer. Thus any application traffic 
over an IP network can be automatically secured by IPsec. Besides, the IPsec suite is an 
open standard. Various kinds of elemental security techniques are included in the 
protocols, and the security service provider can configure the protocols to achieve 
specific demand. 
 
1.3.1 HTTPS based on SSL/TLS 
 
Although Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is not a top-level solution 
for network security, it is widely deployed on the Internet providing a bidirectional 
encryption of communication between specific client and the server, especially for the 
payment transactions on the web based application. The protocol is simply built on 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS) including 
encryption algorithms, message digest functions and digital signatures. The current TLS 
version deployed is TLS 1.2 and is defined in RFC5246 [12]. 
 
The SSL/TLS session is started from a handshake between the client and the server, 
the basic information needed in secure transmission is synchronized during the hand 
shake, as shown in Fig. 1.4. 
 11 
 
 
Figure 1.4   An example of TLS 1.2 handshake. 
 
During the handshaking, the elements needed for secure communication are 
exchanged, including: 
 
Exchange the certificates to authenticate client and server to each other. 
Negotiate the cipher suite to be used for application data transmission. 
Generate a master secret key that protecting cipher negotiation. 
Establish and share a session key, declared as master secret which secures data 
used for cipher negotiation. 
 
After handshake, the application data is exchanged under the encryption selected 
during Cipher Suite Negotiation, as shown in Figure 1.5. 
 
The application data is firstly chunked into segments no larger than 2
14
 bytes, and 
then compressed by selected compression algorithms (TLS 1.2 supports 256 different 
compression methods). The result is then combined with a message authentication code 
(MAC). After that, the whole segment is encrypted by a selected encryption algorithm. 
TLS 1.2 provides four options on encryption: no encryption, stream cipher (RC4 etc), 
block cipher (3DES and AES etc) and Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data 
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(AEAD) cipher. Finally, all the encrypted segments are combined and enclosed as TCP 
packets. 
 
Figure 1.5   Data encryption process under TLS 1.2 protocol. 
 
Both keys for MAC and encryption are calculated from the master secret which is 
always 48 bytes in length and generated by the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. To avoid any 
data modification and replay attacks, MAC is computed from the MAC key, the 
message length, the sequence number which indicates a particular session, and the 
message content. Hence any modification on message or repeated message will lead to a 
new encrypted result. 
 
If the attacker does break an encryption key, all messages encrypted with it are 
revealed. Since MAC is also encrypted, the attacker needs to break both MAC and 
encryption keys to achieve a man-in-the-middle attack. 
 
Generally, HTTPS based on TLS provides the integrity and confidentiality 
protection on data transmission via the use of symmetric encryption and authentication 
functions. It is proposed that the order of the encryption and authentication affects the 
security level eventually [13].  
 
Denial-of-service attacks which attempt to bring the service down could be the real 
threats to TLS. Since TLS runs over TCP, DoS attacks on TCP connections cannot be 
avoided, besides the attacker can initiates a flood of handshake request to exhaust the 
server on RSA decryption. 
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Currently, there are five protocols in the SSL/TLS family, which are SSL 2.0, SSL 
3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. It has been revealed that all the SSL are not secure 
anymore especially as American NSA’s PRISM programme revealed. In TLS, the 
public-key system with perfect forward secrecy has been adopted, making it much safer 
than previous versions. However, according to the survey from SSL labs, only 58.1% 
SSL-enabled web sites support the newest TLS 1.2 protocol by April 2015 [108]. 
 
1.3.2 Security architecture in UMTS mobile network 
 
The technologies of the mobile networks are developed really fast driven by the 
needs of mobile communication. Hence there are quite a number of standards related to 
the security issues. Due to the limitation of space, here we only introduce several 
security features which are included in the 3
rd
 Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
security architecture related to the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System 
(UMTS). UMTS is a 3G mobile cellular system adopted widely by the 
telecommunication operator all over the world. The full content of the security 
architecture is detailed in [14]. And for the security architecture developed by 3GPP for 
4G (LTE) wireless communication standard, the full definition can be found in [15]. 
 
The security features defined in [14] that interested us can be categorized as the 
network access security, user domain security and configurability of security, as shown 
in Table 1.2. 
 
There are two ways to identify a user on the serving network: identification by 
temporary identity (TMSI/P-TMSI) and identification by permanent identity (IMSI). 
And the association between the permanent and temporary user identity is kept by the 
Visited Location Register (VLR/SGSN) in which the user is registered. Normally, a 
TMSI is used to avoid the compromise of the user identity confidentiality. And it is 
valid only in the location area or routing area in which the user is registered. A Location 
Area Identification (LAI) or Routing Area Identification (RAI) is added if the TMSI is 
outside the area. 
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Table 1.2   Security features in UMTS security architecture. 
Security features Description 
Network 
access 
security 
User identity 
confidentiality. 
The identity, the presence and the services of a certain 
user cannot be retrieved by eavesdropping. 
Entity 
authentication 
Authenticate user and serving network to each other. 
Confidentiality 
Algorithm negotiation, key agreement, data 
encryption, signal eavesdropping disproved 
Data integrity Algorithm, key and data haven’t been modified 
User domain 
security 
User-to-USIM 
authentication 
USIM can only be accessed until the user has been 
authenticated to USIM. 
USIM-
Terminal Link 
A terminal or other user device can deny a USIM if 
USIM failed to provide a shared secret negotiated. 
Security configurability The security level can be configured by user. 
 
The allocation of a TMSI is first initiated by the VLR, which generates the new 
TMSI randomly, and then both TMSI and LAI are sent to the user. After replacing the 
old TMSI with new one, the user sends a response to VLR. Hence the VLR can update 
the association between the user’s IMSI and TMSI to its database. If the response is not 
received, both of the old and new association will be maintained. The whole process is 
encrypted by applying a key stream using a bit by bit XOR operation to the plaintext. 
The key stream is calculated by f8 algorithm from a time independent input, the bearer 
identity, the direction of transmission and the length of the key stream along with a 128-
bit cipher key which is shared during UMTS AKA. Actually, UMTS AKA defines all 
the authentication procedures along with the cipher and integrity key. The strength of 
UMTS AKA has been analysed in [16] [17]. 
 
The data integrity is authenticated by f9 algorithm from a random value, the 
integrity sequence number, the direction bit, the signalling data and a 128-bit integrity 
key. While the user data is encrypted by f8 algorithm, the procedure is as the same as 
the encryption during identification message negotiation. 
 
All the encryption algorithms used in UMTS are listed in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3 Encryption algorithms in UMTS. 
Algorithm Description 
f0 Random challenge generation function 
f1 Network authentication function to compute the message 
authentication code including authentication token 
f2 Message authentication function to compute user response 
and expected response 
f3 Cipher Key generating function 
f4 Integrity Key generating function 
f5 Anonymity Key generating function in normal procedures 
f6 MAP encryption algorithm 
f7 MAP integrity algorithm 
f8 UMTS encryption algorithm 
f9 UMTS integrity algorithm 
 
Actually, f0 to f5 are the authentication algorithm which can be specified by the 
telecommunication operators. However, 3GPP does provide a set of algorithm called 
MILENAGE as a reference. The encryption and integrity algorithms in UMTS are all 
based on the Kasumi cipher, which is a block cipher with eight rounds of operation. The 
computational security of MILENAGE algorithm is analysed in [18], while the 
computational security of Kasumi algorithm is analysed in [19]. According to the 
evaluation, the computational strength of these algorithms is still efficient for security 
purpose. 
 
1.3.3 Wireless local area network security 
 
Today, more and more family and company choose wireless local area networks 
(WLANs) in a house or building for the flexibility it provides. This growing trend also 
raises the need for network security. Most of the current WLANs are originally based 
on IEEE 802.11 standard [20]. However, the basic security mechanisms in IEEE 802.11 
standard have been proved to have large flaws and could be broken easily by skilful 
attackers. Therefore, a security enhanced version of the standard is developed called 
802.11i [21]. The new standard not only improves the encryption and authentication 
procedures in original one, it also introduces the key management and Robust Security 
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Network (RSN) implementation. Along with the IEEE 802.1X standard as its 
authentication enhancement, 802.11i is supposed to be the security standard for novel 
WLAN setup. In this section, the core security improvements in IEEE 802.11i are 
introduced. 
 
Generally, IEEE 802.11i standard defines two types of security framework for 
WLANs based on IEEE 802.11: RSN and pre-RSN, as shown in Table 1.4. The 
definition of the pre-RSN is basically a compatibility consideration on old firmware, 
and the definition of RSN contains all security improving aspects. 
 
Table 1.4 Security framework of 802.11i. 
802.11i Security Framework 
RSN supported pre-RSN supported 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Authentication 
Enhancement 
Key 
Management 
Data 
Confidentiality 
IEEE 802.11 
entity 
authentication 
TKIP 
802.1X 
Authentication 
802.1X Key 
Management 
WEP 
Open system 
authentication 
CCMP 
Shared key 
authentication 
 
In order to enhance the data confidentiality, IEEE 802.11i introduces two types of 
encryption algorithms: Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter Mode 
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP). TKIP can be 
viewed as an upgraded version of WEP, both of the algorithms are based on RC4 stream 
cipher. Although TKIP increased the length of Initialization Vector to 48-bit and the 
length of Secret Key to 128-bit, it has been later to be reported as “could be broken in 
one minute [22]”. While CCMP based on a stronger encryption Advanced Encryption 
Algorithm (AES) seems to be a long-term solution. Although several particular attacks 
against AES algorithms have been published [23-25], it is still provide a computational 
security with a enough length key. 
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802.11i replaces 802.1X as the authentication and key management solutions and 
the major improvements are based on 4-way handshake and group key handshake, as 
shown in Figure 1.6. 
 
 
Figure 1.6   4-way handshake and group key handshake 
 
In a 4-way handshake process, all the messages exchanged between the 
authenticator and the supplicant are in an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
message format defined in IEEE 802.1X called EAP over LANs (EAPOL). The first 
message, which contains key information and a random value called key material 
(ANonce), is sent from the authenticator to the supplicant. Upon receiving the first 
message, the supplicant first checks the Replay Counter field of the message. Replay 
Counter is a sequence number which should be incremented by each message exchange. 
After successful validation on the Replay Counter, the supplicant generates a random 
value called SNonce, and derives a pairwise transient key (PTK) with SNonce, ANonce, 
a pairwise master key (PMK) and other information. Then the supplicant sends a 
message back to the authenticator containing: key information, SNonce, the supplicant’s 
RSN information element (RSN IE) and the message integrity code (MIC). MIC is a 
cryptographic digest used to keep the integrity of the message. After the validation of 
the response message, the authenticator deploys the same algorithms and the same input 
value derives the same PTK and then sends the message including: key information, 
ANonce, MIC and the authenticator’s RSN IE. After validating the message 
successfully, the supplicant sends the fourth message back to authenticator containing: 
key information and MIC. If the fourth message is validated by the authenticator, the 
four-way handshake is finished. And the PTK is used as the key to further encrypt the 
data. The group key handshake acts in a similar way to the 4-way handshake. And the 
group transient key (GTK) is sent to the supplicant for receiving broadcast messages. 
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Both GTK and MIC are encrypted by EAPOL-Key encryption key (KEK) and EAPOL-
Key confirmation key (KCK) respectively. And both the KEK and KCK are part of the 
negotiated PTK. 
 
 
Figure 1.7   RSN establishment procedure. 
 
The whole procedure of RSN establishment is shown in Figure 1.7. The connection 
session is first established following the original 802.11 association and authentication 
process. During the process, an RSN IE is used to distinguish pre-RSN connection and 
RSN connection. As shown in Table 1.5, RSN IE contains a list of authentication and 
cipher selector fields for connections. The value of the Element ID field should always 
be 48 in decimal. The Length field indicates the number of octets in the information 
fields excluding the Element ID and Length fields. The Version field shows the version 
number of the RSN protocol. The Pairwise Key Cipher Suite Count indicates the 
number of pairwise key cipher suites contained in the Pairwise Key Cipher Suite List 
field. The Pairwise field refers to two entities that are associated with each other. The 
Pairwise Key Cipher Suite, therefore is the cipher suite being or to be associated 
between communicating peers. Similarly, the Authentication and Key Management 
Suite Count indicates the number of authentication and key management suites 
contained in the Authentication and Key Management Suite List field. In the RSN 
Capabilities field, the requested or advertised capabilities are filled in. By using this 
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field, the receiver can know the security mechanisms the sender supports or is 
requesting. 
 
Table 1.5 RSN information element format. 
Element ID 
 
1 octet 
Length 
 
1 octet 
Version 
 
2 octets 
Group Cipher 
Suite 
4 octets 
Pairwise 
Cipher suite 
2 octets 
Pairwise Cipher 
Suite List 
4m octets 
AKM Suite 
Count 
2 octets 
AKM Suite 
List 
4n octets 
RSN 
Capabilities 
2 octets 
 
If the RSN IE is included, the 802.1X authentication is initiated. After successful 
authentication, both authenticator and supplicant generate a PMK independently. Then 
the PMK is used to derive and verify the PTK and GTK by 4-way handshake and group 
key handshake process respectively. And the PTK and GTK are used to encrypt point-
to-point messages and broadcast messages respectively. 
 
1.3.4 IPsec 
 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a protocol suite to secure the IP based 
communications by applying authentication and encryption on each IP packet of a 
communication session. Since more and more wireless and wired network applications 
tend to be directly based on Internet layer, IPsec becomes an end-to-end security 
solution for a lot of applications, including 4G wireless network, interbank network, and 
VPNs. 
 
IPsec can be implemented in two basic modes: tunnel and transport. In the tunnel 
mode, the entire IP packet is encrypted and encapsulated into a new IP packet with a 
new IP header. The mode is used to create VPN connection. In the transport mode, the 
header of original packet is preserved, only the payload together with a few header 
fields is encrypted. The mode is suitable for Encapsulating Security Payloads (ESP). 
 
While the IPsec documents are too many, long and complex, the core functions are 
provided by: Authentication Headers (AH), ESP and Security Associations (SA). AH 
provides integrity protection, data origin authentication and the protection against replay 
attacks based on MAC algorithms. ESP provides similar services to AH along with 
confidentiality. SA provides solutions that protect the parameters required by AH/ESP 
operation, such as key management and identification. 
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The full definition of AH can be found in RFC 4302 [26]. By adding a bit sequence 
called Authentication Header to IP packet, AH provides integrity protection and 
authentication function. As shown in Figure 1.8, the Next Header field indicates the 
type of the payload following the AH. The Payload Len field indicates the length of the 
AH. The Reserved field must be set to “0” by the sender and is reserved for future use. 
SPI specifies the SA information related to inbound packet. The Sequence Number field 
contains a counter value that increases by one for each packet. And the ICV is computed 
from all the content which is supposed not to be changed during transmission. The 
algorithms used for authentication is defined in RFC 7321 [27], including the MAC 
algorithms based on SHA1 and AES. 
 
 
Figure 1.8   AH format. 
 
The structure of ESP is declared in RFC 4303 [28]. The supported encryption 
algorithms are 128/192/256-bit AES-CBC [29], AES-CTR and 3DES-CBC. And the 
authentication algorithms are similar to AH authentication. 
 
 
Figure 1.9   Top-level format of an ESP packet. 
 
Since IPsec only provides a security framework rather than a specific solution, the 
security of the systems based on IPsec really depends on the implementation. 
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1.4 Physical layer security 
 
After taking a brief overview on the development of network security, it is easy to 
realize that the security issues are always driven by the awareness of the security flaws. 
As in the early days of the telecommunication network, the security issues of the 
network haven’t draw enough concern for both the users and the system designers. 
Hence what we are trying to do now is more like to patch the system rather than to 
create something new. That is also the reason that the confidentiality enhancements are 
always made in the upper layer of networks. 
 
Up to now, the physical layer of the networks is still the place where little security 
exists. Imagine that if there is a cost-effective measure to solve potential security threats 
at this fundamental level, it will make the things much easier for the end users and the 
services providers. 
 
One may mix up the physical layer security (PLS) with the security of physical 
entities, such as the physical access to the media, router and server. In this thesis, these 
issues are categorised into environmental security and human behaviours, while the 
physical layer security we discussed is the information security based on the uncertainty 
principle in physics and the determination. 
 
The first thing to do when we discuss the security of the physical layer is to 
introduce Shannon’s information-theoretic notion of “perfect secrecy”. The key point is 
that, unlike the security provided by the modern cryptography which based on 
mathematical problems, the physical layer security can rely on the physical uncertainties 
that are inherent during the transmission process, caused by noises, loss and gain, and 
most importantly, the different detection environments. 
 
After the introduction to the information-theoretic security, the physical layer 
security techniques in wireless networks and optical networks are reviewed. 
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1.4.1 Shannon’s information-theoretic secrecy theory 
 
Consider the simplest transmission model in Figure 1.10, Alice (transmitter) wants 
to send a message X to Bob (legitimate user), and Eve (eavesdropper) can also access 
the message.  
 
 
Figure 1.10   The simplest transmission model 
 
The perfect secrecy can only be achieved when 
    |H X Z H X  (1.1) 
Equation (1.1) implies the observation of Z by Eve is statistically independent of 
transmitted message X. Although originally the equation was used to explain the 
Shannon’s secrecy model, it leads to several definitions [109] we will use in later 
discussion: information entropy and mutual information. 
 
Let X is the input ensemble of a noisy discrete channel, and Y is the ensemble of 
the output. The sample space of X and Y is {a1,…,ak} and {b1,…,bj} respectively. What 
we need is a quantitative measure of how much the occurrence of a particular case y=bj 
which can tell the possibility of the case x=ak has happened. 
 
The definition of such a measure is derived from a priori probability  X kP a  and a 
posteriori probability  | |X Y k jP a b  of X, which means the information provided about 
the event x= ak by the occurrence of the event y=bj: 
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I a b
P a
 (1.2) 
The base of the logarithm in the definition determines the numerical scale used to 
measure information. The most common base is 2, which leads to the unit of 
information: bits. 
 
It’s easily to find 
  ; ;( ; ) ;X Y k j Y X j kI a b I b a  (1.3) 
Hence 
; ( ; )X Y k jI a b  is called mutual information between the events x= ak and y=bj. 
 
And the self-information of the event x= ak is:  
 
1
( ) log
( )
X k
X k
I a
P a
  (1.4). 
It can be interpreted as the information required to resolve the uncertainty of event 
x= ak. 
 
The conditional self-information of an event x= ak when the occurrence of y=bj is 
defined as: 
 
|
|
1
( | ) log
( | )
X Y k j
X Y k j
I a b
P a b
  (1.5) 
It can be interpreted as the information that must be supplied to an observer to 
specify x= ak after the observer has observed the occurrence of y=bj. 
 
Hence, we have the relationship between mutual information, self-information and 
conditional self-information: 
 ; |( ) ( ; ) ( | )X k X Y k j X Y k jI a I a b I a b   (1.6) 
Equation (1.6) stands for: Total Information of source = Information transmitted + 
Information needed to recover the source. 
 
In fact, entropy is the statistic average of self-information, so we have 
 ( ; ) ( ) ( | )I X Y H X H X Y   (1.7) 
where ( )H X  is the entropy of X, defined as 
      logX X
x X
H X p x p x

  (1.8) 
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and ( | )H X Y  is the conditional entropy of X given Y, defined as 
      || , log |XY X Y
x X y Y
H X Y p x y p x y
 
  (1.9) 
For a noise channel with given error probability, the average information lost can 
be estimated by Fano’s inequality, which defined as follows: 
 
Let x X be a discrete random variable and let 'X  be the observation of X, and 
 ' 'e Xp P x x   is the probability of error obtained when estimating X with 'X . Then 
      | ' log 1b e eH X X H p p X    (1.10) 
Where      log 1 log 1b e e e e eH p p p p p     is the binary entropy function, 
and X  is the cardinality of ensemble X. 
 
With the Fano’s inequality, we can estimate the average information transmission 
rate of any channels with specific error probability. Thus with the model of wiretap 
channel introduced in Chapter 3, the information-theoretic security of a certain 
transmission scheme can be calculated. 
 
1.4.2 PLS in wireless communications 
 
It is fair to say that, due to the inherited broadcasting characteristics, the wireless 
communication is difficult to prevent adversaries from accessing transmitted signals. It 
is also the reason that the physical layer security draws more and more attention to 
compensate the situations. 
 
According to the studies on information theory, perfect secrecy can be achieved 
using physical layer techniques in the condition that the channel of unauthorized users is 
more noisy that the authorized ones or the condition of the channels are unknown to 
unauthorized users [30]. Based on these two points, several techniques are developed to 
add built-in security features in wireless networks to aid the upper-layer security. 
 
The major difference between the wireless physical layer security and the physical 
layer security in optical network is the channel state information (CSI). Due to the 
unstable environment of wireless networks, channel state information, which is used for 
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depicting known channel properties of a communication link, plays a critical role to 
achieve a reliable communication especially in multi-antenna systems. 
 
Since the CSI contains the signal propagating characteristic from the transmitter to 
the receiver, which is unique and hardly to forge, it has been used to generate a “link 
fingerprint” for authentication purpose. An example is shown in [31], where the link 
fingerprint is used for the digital certificate generation. Another application is proposed 
in [32], where the coefficient of MIMO is used as the key only known to the transmitter 
and the receiver. It is difficult for the eavesdropper without corresponding coefficient to 
recover the effects of convolution on the mixed signals thus could not obtain a 
satisfying bit error rate (BER). 
 
Although in as early as 1993, Maurer [33] expanded Wyner’s [30] conclusion 
about the wire-tap channel, and demonstrated a secret key agreement can be achieved as 
long as the received signals of the eavesdropper and the receiver are different, the 
techniques based on such theory are still under development. One of the successful 
examples is the spread spectrum technologies. It is first utilized in military applications, 
provides the transmitted signals the ability against jamming and unauthorized access, as 
well as the data confidentiality. 
 
There are two major spread spectrum techniques: direct sequence spread (DSS) and 
frequency hopping (FH). DSS modulates the original signal with a pseudo-random bit 
sequence (PRBS) which is both known to transmitter and receiver. The modulated 
signal is noise like and could be recovered into original signal by applying the PRBS 
once again. Hence the good autocorrelation property of PRBS is required, and the 
synchronization on PRBS between transmitter and receiver is also important. Frequency 
hopping spread spectrum, instead of spreading the signal in time domain directly, 
spreads the signal by shifting it to different frequencies that are dictated by PRBS. 
 
In practical application, spread spectrum techniques are used extensively in 
wireless networks both for the military and for the civilian applications, benefitting 
from the development of CDMA technologies. However, although the CDMA based 
mobile networks (3G) are performing well in security aspects, the “inherently less 
secure” mobile networks based on OFDM (4G) are commercialized on the increasing 
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demand of transmission capacity. For the absence of the physical layer security in 4G 
which is purely IP based, the security measures are mainly based on IPsec and 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol, both of which are applied in upper 
layers. 
 
1.4.3 PLS in optical networks 
 
The concept of the physical layer security in optical networks has just been formed 
very recently [34, 35]. However, the studies of the security issues in optical network 
have a longer history. Medard started the research on security issues in all optical 
networks in 1997 [36], and has continued her work on developing the information-
theoretic security theory for optical network since then. And the studies on the related 
subjects are developed independently, such as the chaotic optical communication [37], 
the quantum cryptography [38], and the optical code division multiplexing techniques 
[39, 40]. 
 
Quantum cryptography uses quantum mechanical effects to achieve the security 
tasks. And the major application is the quantum key distribution. Since the quantum 
mechanics guarantees that measuring the data carried by quantum will disturb the data 
at the same time, any attempts on extracting the data from quantum exchange will be 
aware by comparing the detection result from the receiver to the original quantum status 
after quantum exchange. Thus, those quantum statuses that haven’t been affected can be 
used for the secret key generation. 
 
Chaotic optical encryption is based on the complexity of nonlinear dynamic 
behaviours of the optical laser. Since chaos is still a deterministic phenomenon, it is not 
as secure as the quantum cryptography. However, the difficulty on the chaos 
synchronization still provides a certain degree of information-theoretic security. To 
extract the data from a chaos carrier, precise synchronization is required. Even a minor 
difference between the transmitter and the receiver will result in poor BER performance. 
Therefore, the transmission imperfections induced by the optical medium have a great 
impact on overall performance. Another secure application of optical chaos is to 
generate the fast pseudo-random bit sequence by utilizing chaotic lasers. Kanter and his 
co-workers have demonstrated a true random number generator based on a chaotic 
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semiconductor laser [41], the single sequence rate can reach up to 12.5Gbps, which is 
much faster than the traditional physical electronic generators. 
The concept of the optical code division multiplexing is firstly inherited from the 
spectrum spread techniques in wireless communication in 1980s [42, 43]. Afterwards, 
the techniques have been extensively explored in the optical communications, especially 
for its inherent security features [44-50]. However, as same as the optical chaos, the 
processes of optical encoding and decoding are also deterministic. As questioned in [51] 
by Shake, the security of the optical code multiplexing is not guaranteed. Later, several 
advanced code modulation schemes are proposed and demonstrated to solve the 
problem [52, 53]. However the limitation remains. By the merit of our proposed 
reconfigurable encoder and decoder, it is possible to design a robust secure system with 
the protection of dynamic optical code. Compared to the OCDM schemes which use 
relative static optical code, our scheme has the potentiality to utilize the optical code as 
the encryption key in the definition of cryptography, which can be any length, random 
chosen and easily to be reconfigured. 
 
1.5 Objectives and outlines 
 
After the review of the security issues in communication systems, it is clear that the 
physical layer security only takes a small fraction in today’s security solutions which 
mainly relies on modern cryptography. However, due to its position in communication 
systems, it is still one of the most fundamental issues that can resolve the security 
problems once and for all. 
 
With the development of the optical processing technologies, a lot of security 
schemes are proposed and claimed to be secure. Thus, there is a need to develop a 
standard mathematical tool to evaluate this physical layer security. Furthermore, since 
the security issue is a delicate and comprehensive problem, how to deploy the security 
techniques properly is also essential for the entire performance. 
 
The objectives of the thesis are as follows: 
 
 28 
 
To develop a standard mathematical tool derived from information theory which 
can be used to evaluate the information-theoretic security level of different optical layer 
security schemes. 
 
To draft a security protocol that is compatible with our proposed reconfigurable 
optical coding device to provide full scope to optical layer security. 
 
Following the introduction, Chapter 2 provides a review of the optical layer 
security approaches based on optical chaotic, quantum cryptography and optical coding 
techniques. 
 
In Chapter 3, a simple and general method to evaluate the information-theoretic 
security level of optical coding schemes is introduced. Our proposed security scheme 
enabled by the reconfigurable optical coding device is also addressed and evaluated. 
 
In Chapter 4, a security protocol based on the reconfigurable optical coding device 
is proposed, including the issue of distribution of optical code, mutual authentication, 
and the packet structures. 
 
At last, a brief summary of the contributions of the presented works and 
suggestions for the future work are concluded in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2   Communication Security Approaches in the Optical Layer 
 
Communication networks based on optical fibres, as the backbone of the Internet, 
are intuitively among the first communication infrastructures to embrace the physical-
layer security. However, in the history of the development of the optical networks, the 
security consideration is mainly focused on the concept of “availability”. Network 
management, optical monitoring and intrusion detection systems are the major concern 
to maintain the robustness of the networks, while the confidentiality of the data is 
usually guaranteed through the modern cryptography. 
 
With the demands on the throughput of access networks increasing excessively, 
and the development of the optical signal processing technologies, the techniques which 
provide data confidentiality in real time in the optical layer are receiving more and more 
interest. Although compared to the wireless communications, optical fibres are difficult 
to be accessed by the potential attackers and there is only very little radiation leaked 
from the fibre, the unprotected data transmitted in it can be extracted quite easily by a 
sophisticated eavesdropper. Therefore, under the circumstances with high data 
confidentiality requirements, the security approaches realized in the optical layer 
become a crucial issue. 
 
At the moment, there are several technologies as the candidates to secure the data 
in the optical layer, including optical chaos, quantum key distribution, and optical 
coding techniques. In this chapter, a brief overview of these techniques is introduced, 
with the comparison of advantages and the challenges of each technique. 
 
2.1 Optical Chaos 
 
Most devices in the current digital communication systems are essentially linear, 
especially for those electronic devices, and the performance of which follows the linear 
system theory. However, taking advantages of the intrinsic nonlinearity of optical 
devices, it is possible to achieve signal modulation, dispersion compensation, 
amplification, noise suppression and so on in the optical layer. One of the applications 
developed especially for security purpose is optical chaos. For such applications, the 
transmitter and the receiver are linked by a channel based on the synchronization of 
chaos, thus the performance of the transmission relies on the accuracy and robustness of 
 30 
 
the chaos synchronization. In this section, we category these techniques into two major 
classes by function: data modulation and pseudo random sequence generation. 
 
2.1.1 Data modulation based on nonlinear dynamics 
 
There are several optical encryption methods proposed and demonstrated which 
utilize chaos related modulations: chaos shift keying, chaos masking, chaos modulation, 
and so on. 
 
 
Figure 2.1   Schematic diagram of chaos shift keying [54]. 
 
Chaos shift keying is implemented by encoding the data through direct current 
modulation of the transmitter, as shown in Figure 2.1. I0 and I1 are injection current 
corresponding to data “0” and “1” respectively. C0 and C1 are chaos pattern generated 
from I0 and I1 respectively. The basic idea of the scheme is modulating the data with 
different chaos patterns. The receiver consists of two lasers driven by the selected 
parameters corresponding to transmitter’s “0” and “1” value (I0 and I1) independently. 
Decoding of the data is done by subtracting the output of the receiver from the signal 
received. In this situation, true chaos synchronization is infeasible since the transmitter 
is current-modulated with the data while the receiver is not. The chaotic state of the 
transmitter is determined by the data. 
 
 
Figure 2.2   Schematic diagram of chaos masking [55]. 
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The data modulation in chaos masking scheme is achieved by directly adding the 
data to the chaotic waveform, as shown in Figure 2.2. The demodulation operation is 
same as chaos shift keying, subtracting the output of the receiver from the received 
signal. In this case, the data is only injected to the receiver and is extracted from 
transmitted signal by subtracting a synchronized chaotic signal C’. However, it has not 
been mathematically proven whether the synchronized signal (C’) can be identically 
reproduced from the transmitted signal (C+M). As the result, the true synchronization is 
infeasible. Nevertheless, the chaotic state of the transmitter is not influenced by the data. 
 
 
Figure 2.3   Schematic diagram of chaos modulation [56]. 
 
In the additive chaos modulation, the data is also added to the chaotic output of the 
transmitter. Meanwhile, the information about the data is sent both to the transmitter 
and the receiver so that the true synchronization is achievable. And the chaotic state of 
transmitter, as well as the complexity of chaos, is related with the data. 
 
A general feature of communication based on optical chaos is that the recovered 
data is affected by the channel noise along with the synchronization error. Figure 2.4 
shows the decoded waveform of the three different schemes. As we can see, data 
recovery is quite difficult to achieve in chaos shift keying scheme because the encoded 
signal has frequent desynchronized bursts. The performance is affected by the 
resynchronization time. According to the report [57, 58], resynchronization is hard to 
achieve when bit rate is over 10Gb/s. The performance gets better when the bit duration 
gets longer than the resynchronization time. In 2005, Argyris with his team 
demonstrated a chaos-based communication system on commercial fibre links [59] and 
the result is perfectly accordance with the theory analysis. The performance of the 
system is degraded significantly when the bit duration is approaching synchronization 
time. 
Transmitter LD -
Data
C
M
C + M M
Receiver LDτ
C
+
τ
C + M
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Figure 2.4  Decoded signals of chaos shift keying (CSK), chaos masking (CMS) and 
additive chaos modulation (ACM) [60]. 
 
In the case of chaos masking scheme, the synchronization error is mainly caused by 
the difference between the transmitter and the receiver. The influence of the data is 
weak comparing to the encoded signal, which is domiated by the chaos synchronization. 
The performance can be improved by deploying a low-pass filter to eliminate the 
interference from the chaos synchronization. 
 
The performance of additive chaos modulation is greatly improved compared to the 
previous schemes since the true synchronization can be achieved. As the result, the 
synchronization noise is minimized, and the channel noise as well as the transmitter 
noise will be the main noise source. Since both the chaos shift keying scheme and the 
chaos masking scheme could not achieve true synchronization, the decoding waveforms 
are apparently noise like for a NRZ signal. In the example of the chaos shift keying 
scheme, it is quite easy to distinguish the two chaos patterns by observing the amplitude 
difference. Only the additive chaos modulation scheme which is truely synchronized 
can recover a good waveform. Still, the occurrence of the desynchronization bursts 
occurs will degrade the performance significantly, as the example shown in Figure 2.4. 
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The system performances measured by BER of these schemes are compared in 
Figure 2.5. The importance of the true chaos synchronization is revealed. 
 
Figure 2.5.  Performance comparisons of chaos shift keying (CSK), chaos masking 
(CMS) and additive chaos modulation (ACM) [60]. 
 
As a candidate in the optical layer for secure communication, although the optical 
chaos schemes have the comparable performance to traditional systems, they are too 
sensitive to the dispersion, distortion, nonlinear signal processing and noise. Besides, 
for any chaotic communication systems, the synchronization between the transmitter 
and the receiver is critical. It requires a good symmetry between the transmitter and the 
receiver to maintain high quality synchronization. Despite of these obstacles which 
prevent the optical chaos from commercial utilization, chaos-based secure 
communication scheme do have their advantages over the traditional encryption 
schemes. Optical chaos based schemes can be performed over continuous number fields. 
Both the chaos signal and data signal can be continuous signal rather than discrete 
digitized data. The encoded signal is noise-like and spectrum spread, which makes it 
difficult to perform a matched detection. Although the speed of optical chaos based 
scheme is limited by the time of synchronization, the coding process can still be 
implemented in all optical domain with high-speed analog signals. 
 
The optical chaos based secure communication systems do have their weakness. 
It’s possible to break a chaos based system without searching for the secret key, as long 
as the encoded signals show low-order statistical characteristics corresponding to the 
data transmitted. In particular, transmission of binary data is risky, since even for the 
high-dimensional nonlinear dynamics, the transmitted signal pattern may be considered 
to reveal some information related data [61]. If the type of nonlinear dynamics is known 
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to the attacker, it is possible for him to use generalized synchronization to decode the 
data. In [62], an optical chaos based scheme on Chua’s circuit is compromised by using 
generalized synchronization. The data is leaked from the variations in the 
synchronization error. In [63], an attack approach is proposed to break the optical chaos 
based system by reconstruct the secret chaotic dynamics completely without any 
knowledge about the type of the nonlinear dynamic. In this scheme, the attacker is using 
time delay to reconstruct the nonlinear dynamics part by part. 
 
In summary, the security of a communication system is not only related to the data 
confidentiality, the availability of the system is also need to be considered and more 
important it is the first issue we should guarantee. It is still a long way to go for the 
chaotic secure communication before we mastered the chaos synchronization in optical 
layer and make it more feasible for practical application. After all, the security issues 
are highly bound to the practical implementation, and need time to evolve to prevent the 
attacks from every aspect. 
 
2.1.2 Pseudo-random sequence generation from chaotic laser 
 
Random number sequence generation is another promising application of chaotic 
lasers. The output of chaotic lasers naturally provides a fast temporal dynamic chaos 
pattern with a large spectral bandwidth. Unlike the traditional time multiplexed ultra-
high speed sequence generation, the speed of chaotic laser is determined by the 
relaxation oscillation frequency, which can be over 20 GHz. With the proper setting, the 
rate of random bit sequences generation could reach up to the 480 Gbps [64]. 
 
The concept of random number generation of chaotic lasers is plain and simple. 
The output signals of a chaotic laser are detected by a photodetector and converted to a 
binary digital signal directly by an analog-to-digital converter (ADC). The ADC 
converts the analog signals into binary digital signals by comparing the amplitude with 
a threshold voltage. An example of random bit sequence generation from chaotic laser is 
shown in Figure 2.6, the output signals of two chaotic lasers are sampled (dots show 
sample point) and detected by certain threshold (black horizontal line). The outcome 
random bit sequence is obtained from the two detected sequences by the XOR operation. 
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Figure 2.6  Concept of random number generation with chaotic lasers [65]. 
 
2.2 Quantum Key Distribution 
 
In quantum physics, the unit of quantum information is the qubit. In a classical 
system, a bit would have to be in one state or the other. However, the qubit could be in a 
superposition of both states at the same time. Hence it is possible to encode one bit into 
a qubit. The two states in which a qubit may be measured are known as basis states. As 
a consequence, there would be different results when the sequence of qubits is measured 
by different basis combination. This basic quantum mechanism makes the quantum 
information system quite different from classical system. 
 
Another interesting phenomenon in quantum physics is quantum entanglement, 
which occurs when pairs of particles are generated in a way that the quantum state of 
each particle cannot be described independently. Similar to the quantum states of 
individual particles, the state of an entangled system could also be expressed as a 
superposition of basis states. The action of measurement would break the entanglement. 
Therefore, the entangled system could also be used for transmitting information one 
time only, making it possible for security utilization. 
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In this section, the fundamental QKD protocols based on single-photon and 
quantum entanglement are introduced, along with the challenges for related practical 
applications. 
 
2.2.1 Security in No-Cloning Theorem 
The no-cloning theorem was first proposed by Wooters and Zurek [66] in 1982, it 
states a fundamental fact that it is impossible to create identical copies of an arbitrary 
unknown quantum state. Based on this theorem, the first QKD protocol was proposed in 
1984 by Bennett and Brassard, known as BB84 protocol. Originally, the protocol 
depicts the quantum system transmitting information by photon polarization states, 
however, any two non-orthogonal states can be used for the protocol including phase, 
polarization and so on. 
 
In BB84, two pairs of quantum states are used for information transmission, with 
each states-pair conjugate to the other, and the two states within a states-pair are 
orthogonal to each other. These pairs of orthogonal states are known as the basis. An 
example of key exchange in BB84 is shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
Alice generates a random sequence of photons, whose polarization states depend 
on randomly selecting one of her basis. Hence the data is represented by four different 
polarization states. When these four polarization states are not all orthogonal, it’s 
impossible to distinguish all of them and the only possible measurement is between any 
two orthogonal states. For example, if we measure the quantum states in “+” basis, the 
result can only be “→” or “↑”, thus if the information is transmitted in “×” basis, all the 
information about its initial polarization state will be lost. 
 
Since Bob does not know the basis of the photons chosen by Alice, all he could do 
is to select a random basis to measure each photon. After the measurement, Alice and 
Bob exchange their basis to each other over a public channel, thus both of them can 
discard the photon where Bob used a different basis, and the rest of the bits can be used 
as a shared key. If Eve without Alice’s basis has gained any information from 
transmitted photons, errors will be introduced in Bob’s measurements. Therefore, as 
long as Alice and Bob compare their shared bits, they will aware the existence of Eve 
when a difference is found. 
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Figure 2.7  An example of QKD in BB84. 
 
2.2.2 Security in Entanglement 
The foundation for entanglement based quantum cryptography is involves the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox [67]. And the most famous protocol based on the 
theory is proposed by Ekert in 1991 [68], known as E91 protocol. The protocol uses 
entangled pairs of photons to achieve information exchange. The entangled photon pairs 
can be created by anyone including Eve. The photons are distributed to Alice and Bob, 
each of them own one photon from each pair. An experimental system based on the 
protocol is established in 2007 [69]. 
 
 
Figure 2.8  An example of QKD in E91. 
 
Consider a source emitting two qubits in the entangled state, and one of them is 
sent to Alice while the other is sent to Bob. Alice and Bob can measure received qubits 
on any random basis independently. After the measurement, Alice and Bob exchange 
their basis on a public channel, hence they can discard the bits measured by different 
basis and the bits left can be used as a shared key, as shown in Figure 2.8. Although 
even Eve can be the one who generate the entangled qubits, the information contained 
in entangled photons is uncertain before the measurement. Suppose Eve prepares 
several pairs of photons by a certain basis, while Alice and Bob use random basis to 
measure them independently. They have 50% chance to measure the qubits with same 
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basis, and only half of the values can be predicted by Eve. However, the action results 
in 25% of errors when Alice and Bob test for entanglement by comparing their 
measurement in public channel, which is the same as the percentage of information Eve 
can predict. Hence the more information Eve has about the key, the more errors she 
creates. 
 
2.2.3 Security in Quantum Fluctuation 
A stream cipher protocol compatible to WDM transmission system is proposed by 
Yuen in 2000, known as Y-00 [70]. The protocol is based on quantum fluctuation of 
light. An example is shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.9  An example of QKD in Y-00 [71] 
 
In this scheme, the information is modulated in multi-level phase or amplitude 
value. And the multi-value phase or amplitude information is arranged as closely as 
possible to achieve an overlapping in the range of quantum fluctuation. Thus only the 
receiver with corresponding multi-value modulation information can generate an 
optimized threshold to distinguish the value of “1” and “0”. The detection result of the 
eavesdropper is significantly interfered by the quantum noise. 
 
2.2.4 Challenge from Practicality 
Up to now, the information exchange relied on quantum mechanism is still the only 
way to achieve the theoretical unconditional security. However, although the quantum 
mechanism appears to provide an effective way to achieve unconditional security, it is 
still difficult to prove the information theoretic security level for a certain QKD system 
as stated in [72, 73], the author of which has proposed the Y-00 protocol. 
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In spite of this fundamental difficulty on the argument of “how secure the QKD 
system could be?” The quantum cryptography is still haunted by a several practical 
problem [74, 75]: 
 
Difficulties in generation of pure single-photon pulses 
The status of the laser used for single photon generation is not stable, by the fact 
that the number of photons in the pulse is random, with a Poisson distribution. 
Theoretically, only the pulses with one photon are secured since the extra photon may 
leak the information to the eavesdropper. Thus to provide the pulse required, the energy 
of signal is extremely small, which result in the reduction of the SNR of the system. 
Currently, only one out of ten attempts on single photon generation can be successful 
and we can’t predict which attempt could succeed. Although a good single photon 
source seems feasible in technology, it still hasn’t been achieved yet. 
 
Response time of single-photon detection 
At present, an InGaAs photon detector working at 1550 nm wavelength can detect 
photons in every 100 ns, thus limiting the bit rate of QKD system. The silicon detector 
working at ~800 nm wavelength is about 1000 times faster. However it is out of the 
range of current fibre communication system. Currently, the demonstrated QKD system 
working at 850 nm can achieve ~5 Mbps of data rate in the LAN area [76]. 
 
Incompatible with optical amplifier/optical signal processing devices 
In traditional optical communication, optical pulses can be amplified by passive 
optical amplifier. Along with the suitable dispersion compensation, the long-haul 
transmission can be achieved. However things are getting changed when the signals go 
into the quantum world. The quantum channel not only requires the direct fibre link, but 
also no amplifier introduced. Thus it makes the environment of single-photon 
transmission extremely rigid. The facts also yield the development of QKD network, 
which is a costly solution to upgrade from the current fibre communication system. 
 
2.3 Optical Coding Techniques 
 
Optical coding techniques are originally enlightened by the spread spectrum (SS) 
techniques in military radio communication systems. However, due to the intrinsic 
differences between optical communication (digital) and radio communication (analog), 
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optical coding techniques are developed into an independent field. Generally, optical 
coding techniques can be used for multiplexing access, optical packet label switching, 
optical signal shaping and processing as well as the security purpose. In this section, 
two categories of optical coding techniques which are most promising for optical layer 
security are introduced. 
 
2.3.1 Temporal Phase Coding 
Temporal Phase Coding (TPC) is the technique to encode and decode optical 
signals by spreading the signals in time domain, the basic unit represents the code 
information is usually called chip, and each chip is phase encoded according to the 
optical code (OC). For the decoding, the encoded signal is processed similarly with the 
OC reversed to the encoding one. The principle of decoding can be explained by the 
aperiodic auto-correlation property [110] of the OC as: 
    , ,
1
N
x x n n k x x
n k
C k x x C k
 
       k=0, 1, …, N-1 (2.1) 
where  ,x xC   is the decoded output, k is the index of the time shift, N is the length of 
the OC, while x, x* are the OC and OC reversed. 
 
Although there are various devices to implement it, the basic model of TPC is 
equivalent to the structure with delay lines and phase shifts shown in Figure 2.10. 
 
Figure 2.10   The schematic diagram of TPC encoding/decoding process. 
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      expin cS t A t i t , (2.2) 
where  A t  is the complex field envelope and c  is the central frequency. And the OC 
 1 2, , , N  x  is applied. Then the complex electric field of encoded signal can be 
modelled as the sum of N time spread chips 
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where N is the code length, ct  is the chip duration. Thus we can get the decoded signal: 
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For the simplicity and without losing generality, we assume  inS t  has a 
rectangular pulse profile with unit energy and there is no in-phase noise.  A t  and 
 exp ci t  can be safely neglected in this way. Then (2.4) is simplified to 
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Hence the performance of TPC is strongly tied to the aperiodic correlation property 
of the OC. However, there is a major difference between time spread coding and 
aperiodic correlation property, as we can see from (2.5), the insertion loss of the 
decoder is increased proportional to the length of the OC. This fundamental structural 
limitation on the length of the OC has a negative effect on the information-theoretic 
security performance of the system, which will be discussed in detail in next chapter. 
 
2.3.2 Spectral Phase Coding 
Spectral Phase Coding (SPC) is the technique to encode and decode the OC 
directly on the spectrum of the signals. The principle is shown in Figure 2.11. 
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Figure 2.11   Basic principle of SPC encoding process. 
 
To decode the encoded signals, we just need to apply a complementary phase shift 
according to the OC to recover the spectrum of the signals. Therefore, the OC could be 
any random sequence. 
 
Assume the spectrum of the optical pulse is an ideal rectangle as shown in Figure 
2.11, A is the peak power of the optical pulse and W is the total bandwidth, and thus the 
input signal can be modelled as: 
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where  sinc sin /x x x . 
 
After the encoding, the spectrum of the signal is sliced into N chips, each of which 
is rectangle with the bandwidth W N . Thus for the OC  1 2, , , N  x , the 
encoded signal can be modelled as the sum of N independent input signals 
corresponding to the rectangle spectrum with the width Ω, 
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Since each chip only has difference in phase, the average of encoded signal would 
be: 
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In the schemes whose phase coding utilizing 0 or π for each chip, let the proportion 
of the “0” chip be α, the proportion of the “π” chip will be 1- α, and (2.8) can be 
simplified into: 
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The peak value of the encoded signal occurs at time t=0, and the peak value of the 
intensity is: 
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Thus when the OC utilized is balanced code, α=0.5, the energy is spread in the time 
duration 2 N W evenly, and the average value is exactly equals to A/N. The fact 
indicates that although the OC utilized in SPC can be totally random, it’s recommended 
to apply balanced code to hide the signal characteristic ultimately if we want to use SPC 
for security purposes. Further discussions will be given in next chapter. 
 
2.4 Brief Summary 
 
In this chapter, we introduced three classes of techniques which can be used for 
optical layer security application. Each of them covers a wide scope of researches and 
has a great impact on various fields. Due to the limitation of the space, only the basic 
principles of them are given with a few recent developments. A brief comparison of 
these techniques is given in Table 2.1. 
 
Compared to the optical chaos and quantum cryptography, the solution with optical 
coding has the good compatibility to the current optical communication network, and is 
simple and easy to be implemented. The demonstrated applications based on optical 
coding techniques have already reached to ~40 Gbps for multiuser and over a few Tbps 
for backbone transmission [77, 79]. These practical and flexible benefits make the 
optical coding to be the most feasible candidate for providing security in the optical 
layer. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison between optical chaos, quantum cryptography 
and optical coding techniques. 
 Chaos Quantum OC 
Source carrier Pulse Photon Pulse 
Data Rate ~2.5Gbps [59] ~5Mbps [69] >40Gbps [77] 
Channel 
Requirement 
Fibre – Tight 
Noise sensitive 
Fibre/Free space – 
Harsh 
Quantum Channel 
Fibre – Fair 
No Dispersion 
Synchronization Chaos Syn. Delicate [78] Asyn./Code Syn. 
Security Criteria 
Nonlinear 
dynamic 
Quantum 
mechanics 
Random Optical 
Code 
Confidentiality Dynamics [54] 
Theoretically 
Perfect 
Dynamics 
Integrity Fair Fragile Good 
Availability Fair Fair Good 
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Chapter 3   Security Performance Analysis for Optical Coding 
Techniques 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss the security performance of the optical coding 
techniques from the following perspectives: code space against Brute-force attack, 
information-theoretic security against eavesdropping and the anti-jamming properties 
by adding artificial noise. 
 
3.1 General wiretap channel 
 
Consider the general model of wire-tap channel as shown in Figure 3.1, assuming 
that the eavesdropper could access the encoded signals as same as the authorized user, 
the information he can intercepted from the encoded signal can be denoted as  ;I X Z . 
And the information transmitted to the authorized user can be denoted as  ;I X Y , as 
indicated in section 1.5.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1   General wiretap channel for optical coding schemes. 
 
According to Wyner’s proof [30], when the channel input X, user’s channel output 
Y, and eavesdropper’s channel output Z satisfy the Markov chain X→Y→Z, then the 
perfect secrecy can be achieved and the secrecy capacity for the channel is defined as: 
 
     max ; ;s
X
C I X Y I X Z   (3.1) 
 
The result reveals one of the fundamental facts of the physical layer security that 
the secrecy is a relative concept which involves the difference of information 
transmission rate between the user and eavesdropper. 
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User
Eavesdropper
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However, in the case of Figure 3.1, we could find that the user’s output Y and the 
eavesdropper’s output Z are determined independently by their own detection method. 
Instead of using the concept of secrecy capacity, we use the value    ; ;I X Z I X Y  to 
depict the ratio of the amount of information intercepted to the amount of information 
transmitted, denoted as α. Thus the value reflects the leakage level of the information 
under a certain physical environment. 
 
 
 
 
;
;
I X Z
I X Y
   (3.2) 
 
It’s clear to see that, 0   only if  ; 0I X Z  , which indicates the perfect secrecy 
is achieved, and the transmission capacity  ;I X Y under the same condition is the 
secrecy capacity [30] for that specific physical setup. When    0 ; ;I X Z I X Y  , the 
eavesdropper can get partial information from encoded signals, however, the user can 
sacrifice the transmission rate to achieve the perfect secrecy by the information 
reconciliation and privacy amplification as depicted in [80]. When    ; ;I X Z I X Y , 
there is no information-theoretic security provided by optical coding process. 
 
Assuming both the eavesdropper and the user can optimize their detection 
threshold, and the bit error rate for them are eae  and ue  respectively, then   can be 
estimated by 
 
 
   
   
2 2
2 2
1 1 log 1 log
1 1 log 1 log
ea ea ea ea
u u u u
e e e e
e e e e

   

   
 (3.3) 
 
3.2 Temporal Phase Coding 
 
3.2.1 Code Space Limitation 
The maximum length of a temporal phase code is restricted by the pulse width pt  
and the data transmission rate R : 
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
 (3.4) 
where bt  is the bit duration. 
 
Meanwhile, the code space of code-sets used in temporal phase coding is ~ L . 
Although the code space can be enlarged by applying poly-phase and multi-level code-
set, there is no efficient way to construct such kind of codeset. Therefore, the code 
length is inverse proportional to the data rate. Assume the pulse width is ~20 fs, the 
code space is limited by data rate as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2  Code space limitation of temporal phase coding (tp=20 fs). 
 
If the time cost per code trial by the attacker approaches to the bit rate, the code can 
be cracked in a few seconds. 
 
Another issue related to the Brute-force attack is that how many portions of code 
need to be correct before the eavesdropper can make a successful guess. In the most of 
the cases, the eavesdropper does not have to make every chip to be right to crack the 
system, which indicates that the actual searching space of the eavesdropper is smaller 
than the code space. Figure 3.3 shows an example of such partially decoding result 
when the length of the optical code is equal to 15. 
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Figure 3.3  Partially decoding of TPC scheme. 
In TPC scheme, each of the mismatched chips will reduce the autocorrelation peak 
power by ~2·P/N statistically, while the peak power of the side lobes is kept at a relative 
low level. P is the peak power of correct decoded signal, and N is the length of the 
optical code. Due to the large amount of side lobes exist, almost 50% of the bit energy 
is spread in the bit interval. Thus if the eavesdropper applies a proper optical thresholder 
to eliminate the interference from the autocorrelation wings, only over 60% correct 
chips are needed to observe a degraded autocorrelation peak for a temporal phase 
scheme with the length of the optical code equals to 511 with a chip-level detector. 
 
3.2.2 Information-theoretic security 
In this section, we consider three different modulation schemes as shown in Figure 
3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4  Examples of different modulation formats of TPC schemes. 
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To optimize the performance of both the user and the eavesdropper, here we 
assume the user has an ideal optical thresholder which has infinite bandwidth and 
infinite output extinction ratio. Hence all the influence caused by side-lobes can be 
neglected including the cross-correlation peak. For the eavesdropper, we assume he can 
perform ideal chip level detection and 1-bit delay interferometer detection. However, 
the receiver noises are counted for both of them. Figure 3.5 shows the simplified model, 
where the rectangular temporal response function is used and the chip duration is 
assumed to be equal to the pulse width. 
 
Figure 3.5   Eavesdropping structure of TPC schemes. 
Assume the peak power of the encoded signal is 1dP  , from equation (2.3) we 
have: 
 
       
1
exp exp
N
en c c n
n
S t i t nt i 

    (3.5) 
 
Thus the decoded signal is 
 
          
1 1
1
exp exp exp
N N
de n m c c c
m n
S t i i i t nt N m t
N
  
 
     (3.6) 
 
The autocorrelation peak consists of contributions from all N chips of the encoded 
signals, while the n-th sidelobe from centre consists of contributions from N-n chips, 
which is suppressed completely by optical thresholder. Hence for the bit level receiver 
and chip level receiver, we have equation (3.7) for OOK modulation: 
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where 
d chipP   is the average power of received signal for chip-level detection, d bitP   is 
the average power of received signal for bit-level detection, 
th  and sh  are the thermal 
and shot noise variances respectively. thN  is the thermal noise spectral density (typical 
value 21 /thN pA Hz  is used in the calculation), where Bk  is Boltzman’s constant, T  is 
the absolute temperature, LR  is the load resistance, chipB  and bitB  are the receiver 
bandwidth corresponding to the chip-level detection and bit-level detection respectively. 
e  is the elementary charge,   is the responsivity of the photodetector. 
 
Since the cross-correlation is assumed to be suppressed completely, the results of 
chip level detection for CSK and M-ary are the same, as well as the results of bit level 
detection. 
 
Thus the error probabilities of the chip-level detection and bit-level detection for 
the user are: 
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For the eavesdropper, we have equation (3.9) for OOK modulation: 
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Since the average power of encoded signal for any optical code and any chip is 
equal to dP , either the bit-level detection or the chip-level detection is not available for 
eavesdropper in CSK and M-ary modulation. However, the eavesdropper can apply 1-
bit delay interferometer detection to recover the data. Assume the average distance for 
any pair of optical codes is d , we have equation (3.10) for CSK modulation: 
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where the sub index diff  and same  indicates the situation when adjacent bits are same 
and different respectively. 
 
The case for M-ary modulation is much more complex. Since the distance for any 
pair of optical codes is assumed to be same, the bit-level detection is not available for 
eavesdropper. It is possible that the information may be leaked by the position of phase 
difference for chip-level detection. For simplicity, we assume the eavesdropper can 
manage to locate the two phase differences corresponding to any pair of adjacent codes. 
Since the position of the phase differences are random, the eavesdropper needs to 
identify every chip correctly to reconstruct the M-ary modulation table. Hence the 
average error probability is 
  1 1
N
e e diffP P     (3.11) 
where e diffP   is the error probability of a single chip difference. 
 
3.3 Spectral Phase Coding 
 
3.3.1 Code Space Limitation 
The length of the spectral phase code is limited by the resolution of the spectrum 
chip, which is only a few hundred as reported [81].  
 T B
p
A
L
t


 (3.12) 
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where T BA   is the time-bandwidth limitation of the optical pulse and   is the width of 
frequency chip. For a 40Gb/s system with ~20fs pulse and 10GHz chip width, the code 
length cannot exceed 220. 
 
Although the code length of the spectral phase code is limited, the value of the chip 
can be set freely. From equation (2.10), we suggest that the binary code for spectral 
phase coding should be the balanced code. Thus for a given code length N, the 
maximum code space is 
 
2
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 
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 (3.13) 
where 
n
k
 
 
 
 is the number of k-combinations for a given set of n elements. 
By applying Stirling’s approximation ! 2
n
n
n n
e

 
  
 
 to equation (3.14), we have 
 
2
2nC
n
   (3.14) 
which is still quite a large number in the current physical environment. Thus the Brute-
force attack seems inefficient against the spectral phase coding scheme. 
 
Similar to the TPC scheme, the partial decoding of the SPC may also leak the 
information, as shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6   Example of partially decoding for SPC scheme. 
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In spectral phase OCDMA scheme, the peak power of the partially decoded signal 
is proportional to the percentage of chips recovered, as shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7   The power distribution of partially decoding in SPC. 
 
The characteristic of partially decoding process in the SPC scheme is easier to be 
estimated with bit-level detector. And with about 70% of the chips are correct, the 
eavesdropper could obtain a degraded BER with a typical thresholder. 
 
3.3.2 Information-theoretic Security 
For the authorized user, the encoded signals can be recovered perfectly under the 
ideal numeric model as shown in Figure 2.11. However, for a code set with the length N, 
the average code distance between a pair of codes is N/2, thus the average beat noise 
induced by another code is 
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Thus we have equation (3.16) for the authorized user in OOK modulation: 
 
1.0
0.0
0.5
50% 100%
P
o
w
er
 o
f 
p
a
rt
ia
ll
y
 d
ec
o
d
ed
 s
ig
n
a
ls
  
a
.u
.
Percentage of correct chips
Average
Peak@cetre
 54 
 
 
2
2
22
00
22
11
1 1
4
    
00
2 22 2
d chip
d bit
B chip
th chip th
th bit thL
shsh
sh bit d bit bitsh chip d chip chip
P A
P A N
k TB N
B N
B NR
eB P eB NeB P eB







  
  
  
     
  
 
         
 (3.16) 
 
And for CSK and M-ary Modulation, we have 
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For the eavesdropper, the direct detection on balanced spectral phase code is not 
available in the ideal case. Instead, he can use a filter with the bandwidth equal to the 
chip width followed by a one bit delay interferometer to detect the OOK and CSK 
scheme. We have 
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Similar to the TPC scheme, to reconstruct M-ary modulation table in SPC also 
requires a fully recovery on chip information. 
 
3.4 Reconfigurable Coding Device 
 
According to the analysis in previous section, it is clearly that due to the inherent 
limitation of the phase encoding and decoding process, the guaranteed information-
theoretic security couldn’t be achieved with limited number of codes. However, for the 
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passive encoder and decoder, increase the number of codes supported by a single device 
means to increase the complexity of the system at both receiver end and the transmitter 
end, thus the cost for the entire system will be multiply increased. By developing from 
time domain spectral shaping (TDSS) techniques, our group proposed a reconfigurable 
coding device based on a dispersive device and a simple phase modulator. Compared to 
the spectral phase coding techniques introduced in the previous section, this time 
domain reconfigurable spectral phase coding device has several advantages especially 
for the secure utilization, as shown in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8   Principle of reconfigurable spectral phase coding device [82]. 
 
If the dispersion is sufficiently high, the dispersed temporal waveform is 
proportional to the pulse amplitude spectrum [83]. Since the individual frequency 
components will be distributed within the stretched envelop after the dispersion. Thus, 
either the amplitude or the phase of corresponding frequency components could be 
modulated independently without the use of optical filters. In our proposed scheme, the 
ultrashort pulse sequence is first modulated in the DPSK data format, and then the 
modulated signals are stretched by high dispersive device. The time duration of the 
stretched envelope sT  could exceed the bit duration. Therefore, the adjacent stretched 
pulses are temporally overlapped with each other. Then the overlapped signal is phase 
modulated by an ultra-long OC with the chip duration cT  lesser than the bit duration. In 
this way, each stretched pulse is encoded by a segment of OC with the effective code 
length s cT T . Since adjacent stretched pulses are overlapped with each other, the 
effective code segment is iteratively applied on each stretched pulse. To decode the 
signals, a complementary OC is required with the code synchronization, followed by a 
reverse dispersion process to reconstruct the autocorrelation signal with high peak 
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power. If the eavesdropper doesn’t know the entire OC sequences, it is impossible for 
him to extract the data from the noise like cross-correlation signals. Furthermore, due to 
the overlap of adjacent bits and the iterative use of the OC segment, the 1-bit delay 
interferometer is information-less. In our demonstration, the code reconfigurable rate 
can reach 40Gb/s, as shown in Figure 3.9. The laser source is an actively mode-locked 
laser diode (MLLD) producing nearly transform-limited 2.8 ps pulses at a repetition rate 
of 10 GHz and spectrally centred at 1549.8 nm. The 40 GHz pulse train is generated by 
multiplexing the 10 GHz pulses using a four-stage planar lightwave-circuit-based 
optical time division multiplexer (OTDM). The pulse train is intensity modulated by a 
lithium-niobate intensity modulator (LN-IM) driven by a 40Gb/s pseudo-random bit 
sequence (PRBS). The sequence is generated from a pulse pattern generator and 
amplified by a radio frequency amplifier (ARF). After that, three identical cascaded 
linearly chirped fiber Bragg gratings (LCFBG) are used to significantly broaden the 
pulse train. Then, a 40 GHz LN phase modulator (LN-PM) driven by a 40 Gchip/s, 
reconfigurable and code length variable pseudo-random OC generator to perform phase 
modulation on the stretched pulse. At the receiver side, similar configuration as the 
encoding part is utilized, but the phase modulator is driven by the complementary code 
patterns for spectral phase decoding. 
 
recon 
Figure 3.9 Experimental setup of the 40Gb/s secure optical communication system 
based on reconfigurable coding device. PC, polarization controller [84]. 
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This scheme greatly extends the length of the OC with the ultimate flexibility on 
the code format. Since the optical code is active applying to the signals, unless the 
passive decoder, no more beat noise is induced. At the extreme situation, the length of 
the OC can be extended as same as the length of the signals, making the one-time pad 
achievable in optical layer. 
 
For a signal encoded by a limited length (N) of OC, assume the length of encoded 
data is M, and the data rate is R, we have 
 cT M NR  (3.19) 
Thus effective code segment length l for one stretched pulse is 
 sl NRT M  (3.20) 
Then the average searching time for crack a single segment is 
 12 sNRT Mtrial sT T
   (3.21) 
From (3.21) we can see the duration of stretched pulse should be as large as 
possible to raise the average searching time for crack a single segment to the impractical 
range. 
 
Assume the average probability for eavesdropper to crack a single segment is 0P , 
the probability for eavesdropper to crack a specific OC is 
 
 s
M
RT
crack oP P  (3.22) 
 
However, although the system has been demonstrated successfully for long-haul 
transmission, one of the most important issues hasn’t been solved: the distribution of the 
ultra-long OC. In the next chapter, we will discuss the issue of OC distribution, along 
with the other aspects of the information security. 
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Chapter 4   Optical Code Security Protocol for Dynamic Optical Code 
Link Initiation 
 
With the steep rise in growth of the optical communication network throughput, 
optical layer security has become quite promising for the ability to provide real time 
protection in ultrahigh data transmission. Various optical coding schemes enabling 
optical layer security have been proposed and demonstrated in different conditions and 
considerations [84-87], however, to the best of the author’s knowledge, none of them 
consider protocol development. It is true that a trusted secure technique is important for 
the construction of a secured system, yet how to deploy it properly is also quite critical 
for system realization. 
 
In this chapter, a primitive protocol of optical layer security based on optical 
coding techniques is presented. This is the first time a security protocol has been 
introduced for the reconfigurable optical coding techniques. The protocol encapsulates 
optical coding techniques into a feasible security module, and along with other security 
techniques, constitutes a brief model of an optical layer security solution. 
 
4.1 Optical Code Security Protocol in Optical Communication System 
 
The major motivation of Optical Code Security Protocol (OCSP) is to design a 
structure to enable optical layer security that is based on our proposed reconfigurable 
optical coding techniques. The protocol initiates a dynamic shared secret channel 
between the entities involved in the communication. This established dynamic shared 
secret channel, which is in accordance with specific optical code (OC), is called a 
secured OC link. From the security consideration, the OC information must be hidden 
completely from unauthorised users, inter nodes and malicious attackers. As a result, the 
design of a feasible security protocol to distribute the OC secretly is essential to fulfil 
the security requirement of the system. 
 
To provide a full scale of network security, the protocol is designed to maintain the 
identity authentication, the data integrity checksum and the construction and the 
distribution of the dynamic OCs. Each security feature can be achieved by a separate 
module and operates together as long as the data is in the designed format. To maintain 
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the flexibility of the protocol, each security module is designed in similar structure and 
contains all the information that have to share between the entities involved in the 
communication. It should be noted that the proposed optical code security protocol is 
complete original. However, various open source algorithms are included as the 
supplements. 
 
Before we consider the OCSP further, it is necessary to make a clarification about 
the terms we used, as shown in Table 4.1. A complete exchange always consists of a 
request and a response. The responder should only send a message when a request has 
been received. This strict rule is mainly for mutual authentication purposes. Thus after 
an OC link has been established, each entity can initiate the request for data 
transmission. 
 
Table 4.1 Clarification of the terms. 
Term Description 
Entity The end involving the communication. 
Message The information sent from one entity to another. 
Exchange Consists of a pair of messages, a request and a response. 
Requestor 
The entity initiating the OC link. The message sent by the requestor is 
denoted with sub-index q. 
Responder 
The entity responds to the OC link request. The message sent by the 
responder is denoted with sub-index s. 
Shared Secret 
The information shared by the D-H key exchange, which is used for 
generating the key material. 
Key Material 
Generated from the shared secret and used for generating the OC and 
encryption keys. 
 
In this section, two deployed scenarios are considered, and the necessary elements 
of OCSP are discussed. 
 
4.1.1  Basic Point-to-Point Transmission 
 
In this scenario, both entities involved in the communication are directly connected 
by an optical fibre, and there is no other form of O-E-O conversion needed during 
transmission. In other words, data transmitted can be hidden completely without causing 
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connection problems. Thus, all the messages can be encapsulated into OC link payloads, 
as shown in Figure 4.1. Once the OC link has been established in this scenario, a 
reliable channel is formed between two entities, to which the data transmitted is 
completely transparent. While the eavesdropper without the OC can neither extract the 
data nor modify them, the only ways he can interpose the communication is to crack the 
OC successfully in real time or to disable the OC link. Since the OC link is directly on 
the optical layer, the data in all kinds of formats is protected. 
 
 
Figure 4.1   The position of the OC link in the TCP/IP network model 
for the point-to-point scenario. 
 
The security of the OC link depends on the strength of the seed used for dynamic 
synchronized OC sequences generation. Also, the seed itself can be pre-shared between 
two entities by any secure method, including novel Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) 
protocol, traditional Diffie-Hellman (D-H) exchange and even a private offline 
exchange. 
 
The schematic diagram of a basic back-to-back secure communication system 
enabled by OCSP is shown in Figure 4.2. Before the OC link establishment, the data is 
directly modulated onto the optical carrier, and the modulated signals are transmitted 
without protection. To establish an OC link, a D-H exchange is initiated on this public 
channel to generate a common shared secret between the transmitter and the receiver. 
Then the OC and the keys for other security purposes are generated by each peer 
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independently from the shared secret. After the D-H exchange, the data can first be 
protected by encryption algorithms and then encoded by OC. Thus, the energy of the 
optical pulse for each bit is spread into the entire bit interval according to the OC. At the 
receiver end, a complementary OC is used to decode the encoded signal to reconstruct 
the autocorrelation peak and recover the original data. 
 
Figure 4.2 OCSP system schematic diagram. 
 
4.1.2 Packet Switching Network 
 
In this scenario both entities involved in the communication are in a scaled packet 
switching network, which can be any type of network supporting all optical 
transmission, such as Ethernet, TCP/IP network, and Multiprotocol Label Switching 
(MPLS) network etc. Other than encoding the entire data stream, the routing 
information, which is usually a header or label, needs to be accessible for the nodes in 
the packet switching network. As a result, only the payload can be encoded by OC, 
which leads to a mergence between OCSP and the packet switching protocol, as shown 
in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 The position of the OC link in the packet switching (IP) network. 
 
Source
Fast Reconfigurable 
Encoder
DPSK 
Demodulator
Balance 
Detector
Fast Reconfigurable 
Decoder
Data/OC encoded data OC
OC-link
Layer
Link
Layer
Internet
Layer
Transport
Layer
Application
Layer
Frame headerFrame payload
OC 
Link 
header
OC Link payload
Frame footer
IP payload
IP
HDR
UDP data UDP HDR
Data
Terminal
2
Terminal
1
Packet Switching
Network
t
… Encoded Payload
IP header
 62 
 
Apart from point-to-point transmission, where the OC link could be maintained all 
the time, the OC is deployed packet to packet in the packet switching network. 
Therefore, additional data exchange is required for OC link establishment. As a result, 
OCSP functions as part of the layer 2/layer 3 protocol, while providing a certain degree 
of optical layer security. 
 
4.1.3 Discussion of Compatibility 
 
Since our reconfigurable OC coder is based on coherent phase modulation 
techniques, the minimum requirement of OCSP is that the link must be phase 
insensitive and dispersion compensated. To be compatible with the packet switching 
network, it is necessary to insert an OC initiation header between the original header 
and the payload. As long as the OC initiation header is accessible, the OC encoded 
payload data is transparent to the upper layer services and applications for authorised 
users. 
 
As analysed in previous sections, OC link mainly provides data confidentiality 
based on information-theoretic security along with a degree of integrity protection, 
Therefore, to achieve a comprehensive security level, additional security techniques 
must be included, especially for the authentication. The fact that dynamic OC 
synchronization requires a shared secret exchange makes OCSP quite extendible. The 
shared secret can be used to generate keys for authentication, integrity checking and 
even further encryption. In addition, this shared secret exchange happened before any 
upper layer applications, which indicates that OCSP has the potential to reduce the 
complexity of the upper layer security application procedure. 
 
4.1.4 Modularity and General Procedure 
 
It is a trend that a good security system should remain as simple as possible, as 
documented in the NIST’s report on computer security [88]. On one hand, the more 
complex the mechanism, the more likely it is that it may contain exploitable flaws. On 
the other hand, the more complex the mechanism, the more likely it is that its security 
performance will be more difficult to evaluate, while the simpler mechanisms always 
require less maintenance and are easy to upgrade or replace. Therefore, in our proposed 
OCSP, we are trying to divide the entire security system into several less co-dependent 
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modules. Each module fulfils a specific security function and can be deployed on 
demand, leading to a vital security system with great flexibility and extensibility. 
 
 
Figure 4.4   Functioning modules in OCSP 
Figure 4.4 shows the major functioning modules in OCSP. The core module is the 
OC coding module which provides data confidentiality in the optical layer. Since 
maintaining this security feature requires a shared OC between the two entities of the 
communication, the key distribution module is also a must. Up to now, the most applied 
key distribution solutions are still based on computational complexity and processed in 
the electronic layer, for instance, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (D-H) algorithm. As 
the patent of D-H has expired, it has already become a public algorithm and is still 
proving to be quite capable and efficient for key distribution. Moreover, the ephemeral 
Diffie-Hellman (DHE) which can provide perfect forward secrecy has been adopted in 
the newest version of Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [89]. For a mature TLS 
server, the ephemeral D-H key pair could be generated in one second (in the same D-H 
group) with only a very small fraction of computing power is used. When combined 
with our reconfigurable optical layer coding techniques, the D-H algorithm becomes 
much stronger. In [90], a typical way to evaluate the strength of public key algorithms is 
provided. Roughly, the computational time to crack a 1024bit MODP (More Modular 
Exponential [91]) D-H group is around one year, which is considered to be not secure 
enough in the electronic layer. However, things are very different in the optical layer. 
As reported in [92], even without the consideration of maintaining the features of the 
encoded signal, the maximum delay time of the novel optical buffer is only around 
50,000 bits, which only lasts 5μs in a 10G communication system. In other words, if the 
attacker could not crack the OC in 5μs, he would never get an opportunity to test it. This 
limitation on the optical buffer also limited the ability of Brute-force attackers. Notice 
that, the value in Table 4.2 is calculated in the condition that the data rate is 700Gb/s, 
which indicates that the actual delay time is quite small. 
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Table 4.2   Comparison of different optical buffer approaches [92]. 
Technique 
Slow Light Delay Line 
EIT-QD CRS-Si CRS-ideal Silicon Silica 
Maximum 
Delay 
28 bits 160 bits 700 bits 7000 bits 50,000 bits 
 
The tiny purple block in the right corner of the module block in Figure 4.4 
indicates that there are optical approaches instead of electronic approaches. However, as 
both Quantum Key Distribution and Multiprotocol Label Switching are still under 
development, our original OCSP will only contain mutual commercialized and open-
sourced protocols and algorithms. Although in this section these all-optical related 
approaches will not be discussed, it must be pointed out that our reconfigurable OC 
coding techniques have the potential to be compatible with these protocols. 
 
The packet routing and synchronization module is an optional module that depends 
on the network environment. While the authentication module is considered to be a 
must since shared time-varying OC does not provide any authentication features. As 
long as the OC link has been established, it is almost impossible for an attacker to 
modify the data transmitted on the link unnoticed without the right OC. Thus the impact 
of the integrity check algorithm is less important. Considering the transmission errors 
are the major source of impaired integrity, the preferable algorithms for the integrity 
check are Error-correcting codes (ECC), Forward error correction codes (FEC), Cyclic 
redundancy checks (CRC) or simply checksum. 
The general procedure of OCSP is shown in Figure 4.5. Once the OC link is 
established, all the information is transmitted on the OC link including the 
authentication process and the new proposal for the renewal OC link. Thus without the 
OC, the potential attacker can barely perform any kind of traditional cryptanalysis 
attacks. Although it is not shown in Figure 4.5, each data packet can be further 
protected by the integrity checking module and other symmetric encryption algorithms 
if needed. However, considering the same function is also provided by the OC link, the 
related extension is only an optional choice rather than a necessary module. To reduce 
the threats of Denial-of-service attack, as we can see from Figure 4.5, the OCSP is 
unbalanced in design. The responder only acts when he receives a legal request, while 
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the requestor takes on the responsibilities of the transmission. Thus to maintain a 
connection, the requestor will use far more resources than the responder. 
 
 
Figure 4.5   General procedure of OCSP. 
 
To simplify the protocol, we managed to compress the entire OC link initiation 
procedure into few message exchanges as possible, as shown in Figure 4.6. The detailed 
definitions of the segments are given in section 4.3. 
 
Basically, two exchanges are needed to establish a reliable OC link. The main 
purpose of the first exchange is OC distribution along with other configurable 
information related to other security aspects. The header segment contains the ID of 
both the entity for routing purpose. The link_E segment is the optical code link module 
and contains the parameters which are used for code generation, including: code 
generation algorithms, the length of the OC, and the chip rate of the OC. The D-H 
segment contains the Diffie-Hellman public key, which are used to generate the key 
material. The nonce segment is an arbitrary random number that used only once per 
Requestor Responder
Proposal Option
OC Link Proposal
Proposal
Accepted?
Yes
No
Yes
Time Out
Proposal
Completed?
Key Material 
Generation
Key Material 
Generation
Certificate 
Generation
Complete Proposal 
Authentication
Required?
TerminatedAuthentication
Succeed?
Authentication
Succeed?
Certificate 
Generation
No
Yes
Yes
Data Transmission
Yes
Data Transmission
OC Link
Re-initiation?
OC Link Proposal
Time Out
Proposal
Completed?
Complete Proposal 
Yes
Yes
No
No
OC Link Initiation
Authentication
Data Transmission
OC Link Update
 66 
 
message. It prevents the replay attacks and is used to generate the unique key materials 
that correspond to the current session. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Message exchanges in OCSP for OC link initiation. 
N: Nonce Segment, D-H: Diffie-Hellman Segment, Link_E: OC Link Segment,  
AuthReq: Authentication Request Segment, ID: Identity Segment,  
HDR: Header Segment, IC: Integrity Checking Segment, q/s: requestor/responder 
 
It is true that the certificate exchange (identity authentication) could be done in 
either the first exchange or the second exchange. However, since the information in the 
first exchange is totally public, it is not wise to put important information there. Putting 
the identity authentication in the second exchange also exposes the first exchange to 
threats of Man-in-the-middle attacks, but due to the identity authentication in the 
following exchange, nothing valuable is leaked when the authentication fails. While 
there is a chance that the attacker uses his own ID to replace the requestor’s ID and 
keeps everything else unmodified. In this case, the responder will consider the attacker 
as a legal requestor, and finishes the entire key exchange process. Thus the attacker 
could gain a shared secret with the responder and forward the secret to the requestor to 
make the requestor believe he is communicating with the responder. To eliminate this 
threat, it is critical to generate the key material with both entities’ ID. In this case, 
although the attacker shares the secret with the responder, the shared secret received 
from the attacker will generate the wrong key and make the OC link terminate. Figure 
4.7 shows an example of a Man-in-the-Middle attack against the first exchange. 
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Figure 4.7 Man-in-the-Middle attack against the first exchange. 
 
If the OC/key is only generated from the D-H shared secret, the attacker will access 
the D-H shared secret and generate any key he needs, while both the requestor and the 
responder will not be aware of the attack. The requestor believes he is communicating 
with the responder, while in the meantime the responder believes he is communicating 
with the attacker. When the second exchange begins, the attacker can just do the identity 
authentication with the responder and leave the requestor aside. Thus all the information 
sent from the requestor will be decrypted by the attacker. 
 
If the OC/key is generated from the D-H shared secret combined with the ID, the 
requestor will time out since the key he holds is generated from the requestor-
responder/requestor-attacker, while the key of the responder is generated from the 
attacker-responder. The key will never match, thus no useful information is leaked. 
 
 
4.2 Consideration of the Secured Optical Code Link Initiation 
 
As shown in Figure 4.5, it is quite important to initiate the OC link correctly to 
provide guaranteed security. On the other hand, after the OC link has been established, 
the data transmission process could be quite straightforward, providing a high 
transmission speed with sound optical layer security. 
 
4.2.1  Features of Optical Code Link 
 
As demonstrated in [82], our proposed reconfigurable OC coder supports totally 
random sequences, the variable length of the OC and variable chip rate. Therefore, at 
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least two parameters related to OC need to be negotiated during the initiated exchange: 
OC length and the chip rate. 
 
OC length is the most significant parameter related to the strength of the OC link 
and is also the equivalent key length of the OC link. Technically there is no limitation 
on the chip rate. However, for simplicity, the clock signal of OC is usually generated by 
time multiplexing the clock signal of the data, therefore the chip rate is practically set to 
be an integer multiple of the data rate. 
 
Apart from the inherited OC parameters, all security parameters related to the OC 
link have to be settled down, including: 
 
• Diffie-Hellman Group 
• Pseudo Random Function (PRF) algorithm 
• Authentication method 
• Integrity check algorithm 
 
All the key lengths of these algorithms are suggested to be no less than the length 
of the OC to provide an equivalent computational complexity compared to the OC 
length. However, as explained in section 4.1.4, it is possible to use a shorter key as long 
as the computational time complexity is much longer than the life time of the optical 
encoded signals. Considering the fast configurable features of our optical coding 
devices, reliable security can be achieved when the computational time complexity of 
the related cryptography algorithm is longer than the life time of an OC. 
 
4.2.2 Shared Secret and Optical Code Generation 
 
Since the OC in our system could be a totally random sequence, it increases the 
flexibility when we choose the key distribution method. While the deployment of QKD 
is limited by the network environment, as indicated in Chapter 2, the Diffie-Hellman 
exchange has been developed mutually both in software and hardware implementation. 
Currently, the Diffie-Hellman Group is widely used as the shared secret algorithm in 
many security applications. In [91], several Diffie-Hellman Groups are defined for the 
Internet Key Exchange which can be inherited in the OCSP. The relative key length of 
each Diffie-Hellman Group is listed in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.3  The relative key length of different D-H groups 
Length of Prime Relative Key Length 
1536 bit 90~120 
2048 bit 110~160 
3072 bit 130~210 
4096 bit 150~240 
6144 bit 170~270 
8192 bit 190~310 
 
The basic concept of the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement is defined in [93] and the 
D-H shared secret (DHs) is generated as follows: 
 
 1
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DHs g p
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



 (4.1) 
 
where p and q are both large primes, h is any integer in the range of (1, p-1), and xq, xs 
are the private keys of the requestor and responder respectively. 
 
However, instead of doing the calculation shown above, each entity performs the 
computations as follows: 
 
 
mod
mod
s
q
x
q
x
s
DHs y p
y p


 (4.2) 
where yq and ys are public keys for the requestor and responder respectively. 
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An illustration of the process is shown in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8  The process of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
 
The length of the shared secret (DHs) is the same as the length of the prime p. For 
simplicity, the common message is 2 (g =2). Although usually there is no specific 
definition of the length of the private key of D-H algorithms, it is intrinsically in the 
range (1, p-1). If the length of the private key is defined as l, then the value should be in 
the range  12 ,2l lx  . 
 
After the Diffie-Hellman exchange, a required length of secret is shared between 
two entities. Each party can generate a seed derived from a D-H shared secret. The seed 
is also used for generating OC, along with keys that are used for authentication and 
integrity protection. 
 
Figure 4.9 Key material generation 
As shown in Figure 4.9, the key seed is generated from the output of the negotiated 
PRF algorithm. Since the PRF algorithm is fixed, when the required length of the key 
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material is greater than the length of the output of the PRF function, an iterative 
generation procedure can be used to create the rest of the key seed. The key material is a 
combination of the iteration results and each segment takes a fixed length of bits 
according to the negotiation. The meaning of nonces and link IDs will be explained in 
the following sections. 
 
One of the merits of our reconfigurable optical coding scheme is that there is no 
specific requirement for the format of the code pattern. Thus our scheme is compatible 
with any pseudo random number generator. Currently, there are bunches of pseudo 
random function algorithms specified by a number of standard bodies including NIST, 
ANSI X9 committee and so on. Also, the software application can be easily supported 
by the open source project: OpenSSL library. Although the motivation for the project 
was originally to develop a robust, commercial-grade SSL/TLS protocol, the algorithms 
in its cryptography library are widely used for general security purposes. 
 
Apart from the software based function, the hardware random number generator is 
also supported. Intel has embedded Secure Key Technology in their latest processors 
(Ivy Bridge) for random number generation, which means for most personal computer 
users, no additional hardware modules are needed for OC generation. However, for 
ultimate security consideration, a self-designed hardware or open source software is still 
preferable. 
 
An extra coding function may be added to keep the OC for each bit balanced, 
leading to the maximum informatics-theoretic security. The question could be solved by 
applying a balanced code generating function [94] which uses the parameters from a 
shared secret based on Knuth’s construction [95]. Here, the decoding of the balanced 
code is not required. 
 
Define  
2
M
C M
M
 
  
 
 as the total number of balanced numbers of length M. If 
we want to develop a balanced code-set that corresponds to N bits information, clearly 
we need to have enough parity bits p so that   2NC N p  . According to Stirling’s 
approximation, p must follow 
2
1
log 0.326
2
p N   in any balanced codes. 
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Hence a balanced code can be described with 2 p  information bits and p parity bits, 
which means a 264 bits balanced code can be generated by a 256 bits random sequence 
with 8 parity bits. The procedure of balanced code generation is as follows: 
 
Let  w n  be the total number of ‘1’ in the binary sequence n. Let  iw n  be the 
number of ‘1’ in the first i bits of n. Let 
i
n be the binary sequence n with the first i bits 
complemented. For example, if n=10110,  w n =3,  3 2w n  , 3 01010n  . Thus we 
have 
 
      2 iiw n w n i w n    (4.4) 
 
The relation leads to the fact that every sequence n can be associated with at least 
one i so that 
i
n is balanced. Hence the smallest i can be called as the balancing position 
of n. In other words, it is a way to produce balanced code from original sequence n. 
However, since the generated sequence can be conflicting, an extra identity should be 
added as a unique label for each balanced code. This can easily be achieved by encoding 
i into a balanced sequence u of length p. Therefore, 
i
un  is the balanced code mapping 
from random sequence n. 
 
Regardless of what data processing procedures are taken for OC and key 
generation, since the only source of secret entropy in this computation is DHs (Nq and 
Ns are unique but public), although the length of the key material could be much longer, 
the effective key length is still limited by the length of DHs. 
 
The length of the key material is related to the length of the key we need for 
different security modules. For two directions of exchange, the key could be different. 
 
 
4.2.3 Authentication 
 
The most applied authentication methods are Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) and Digital Signature. Considering the physical accessible feature of our fast-
reconfigurable coding devices, the Digital Signature issued by an Authentication Server 
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(AS) when any entities are added into the known network is preferable. Unlike a mobile 
network which requires the flexibility of network switching and transferring, the 
structure of optical connections is quite stable. Thus the issue of a Digital Signature 
would never become a problem. The procedure is shown in Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10   The identity authentication procedures. 
 
 A node sends a certificate request to AS, including his identity, the public key 
related to the identity and encrypted by his private key (○1  in Figure 4.10). 
 After verifying the identity of the node, AS issues a certificate to the node, 
which is generated from the identity of both the node and AS and encrypted by 
AS’s private key (○2  in Figure 4.10). Hence the certificate cannot be forged by 
any entity. If the signed certificate or encrypted data are modified, the recovered 
identity will be changed unexpectedly. 
 When other nodes request authentication from the node that has the certificate, 
the response message includes: the hash value of the last sent message and the 
signed certificate encrypted by his private key (○3  in Figure 4.10). 
 AS will issue the public key that corresponds to the signed certificate to the 
other node so the node can decrypt the signed certificate and validate the 
identity. 
Since the authentication proceeds right after the OC link initiation and uses the 
content (part of which is random) of the OC exchange as validation, although an 
eavesdropper may eavesdrop the content of the OC exchange and store it, it is 
impossible for him to forge or modify an authentication message without a private key. 
He cannot perform a Man-in-the-middle attack either, since every message exchanged 
during the session is bound to the session and cannot be modified, thus it cannot work 
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for masquerading purposes by forwarding the message directly to another entity. The 
only opportunity that he could get a fake identity is when he joins the network by 
claiming to the AS that he has the same identity (Device ID/MAC address) as the target 
and gets a corresponding signed certificate. In this case, the attacker will be treated as 
the target user and will cause a network conflict when the target user is still online. This 
is the reason an offline method is suggested for securing this procedure. 
 
Another way to break the system is to masquerade as the trusted AS. However, all 
the information issued by a real trusted AS is protected by its own private key and the 
corresponding public key is issued to every node when the AS is claimed to be trusted 
by them. Hence to masquerade as an existing AS means to crack the public key 
algorithm. An alternative way is to claim to be an AS and then issue fake certificates 
and corresponding public keys to other nodes. Hence in any circumstance, any operation 
related to modifying the trusted AS should be treated very carefully by users. This is 
also the reason an offline method is suggested when the new node wants to join the 
network. It is also important to keep AS activated all the time, in case any node in the 
network wants to pretend to be a fake AS when the real AS is offline, especially in a 
broadcasting network. 
 
4.2.4 Integrity Checksum 
 
After the OC link has been established, there is no way for a potential attacker to 
modify the encoded data without knowing the value of OC. Hence the integrity check 
module is only used for transmission error detection. Therefore, FEC could be 
introduced to replace the traditional integrity check hash function such as HMAC_MD5, 
HMAC_SHA1, DES_MAC, AES_XCBC. In extreme cases, the entire integrity check 
module can be replaced by a simple linear checksum segment without a cryptography 
hash function. 
 
4.2.5 OC Link Renewal and Lifetime of the OC 
 
Once the OC link is established, the renewal of the OC can be achieved in two 
ways. The first method is direct exchange. It is possible to exchange the information of 
the new OC publicly on the existing OC link as long as the link is considered to be 
secure. In this way, no time consuming algorithms are involved so the renewal of the 
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OC can be achieved at an ultra-high speed. The second method is renewing the OC with 
the new D-H shared secret. It is required to renew the OC with the new D-H shared 
secret when the OC link is considered to be compromised by a potential attacker. 
Although the security of the OC link is reliable, the original D-H value can be cracked. 
Since all the values used for key material generation are exchanged on the public link 
initially, it is possible for the attacker to synchronize the generation of the OC. In this 
scenario, the ephemeral D-H exchange is suggested to provide perfect forward security. 
However, the D-H algorithm is comparatively time-consuming, which will result in a 
sacrifice in the packet transmission rate. 
 
Apart from exchanging the value of OC directly, a random value (in direct 
exchange mode) or a new D-H value (in new D-H mode) is exchanged for seed 
generation, and the new OC is generated following the method introduced in 4.2.2. Due 
to the fact that the chip rate is always higher than the bit rate, the length of the required 
OC is naturally longer than the value exchanged, which is the reason the OC should 
always be generated from a shorter seed. 
 
To reduce the complexity of the OCSP, the lifetime of an OC is set by the requestor 
by default. The requestor should be responsible for setting a proper lifetime for OC 
considering the security level he requires. Generally, there are two factors that affect the 
lifetime of the OC, the strength of the OC and the strength of the D-H value. Although 
the computational complexity remains the same, the length of the OC can be extended 
on demand by using the pseudo-random function iteratively to make the signal analysis 
infeasible. Considering the physical limitation on real-time chip-level detection, the 
strength of the D-H value is essential for OC lifetime determination. The OC must be 
renewed in less time than the estimated time needed for D-H value cracking. 
 
4.2.6 Packet Routing and Preamble Synchronization 
 
As shown in Figure 4.11, the routing information is contained in a header/label 
outside the OC initiation packet. And the synchronization signals are right after the 
header of the OC link packet. 
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Figure 4.11   Packet routing label and preamble synchronization signals. 
 
The label in Figure 4.11 is the original packet header, while from the HDR to 
Link_E is the packet of the OC link. The packet synchronization signal is right after the 
header of the OC link. Tg and tg are the guard time of packet switching and OC 
generation. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Schematic diagram of packet synchronization. 
 
An example of packet synchronization is shown in Figure 4.12. Similar to the 
packet switching, the signals of the OC link header are also separated from the encoded 
payload signals by a simple reflective filter and the packet synchronization information 
is detected by a simple detector which provides a sequence of clock reference signals to 
the pulse pattern generator (PPG). 
 
4.2.7 Packet Sequence, Nonces and Optical Code Link ID 
 
The Packet Sequence is an identifier that indicates the retransmission of the packet. 
Each entity of the OC link maintains two active packet sequences: the next one to be 
used when sending a request and the next one it expects to see when receiving a request. 
The sequences increase every time a request is generated or received. 
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Each message of OC link negotiation contains a unique random value called a 
nonce. This is an indicator to make each negotiation unique. Also, to make sure the key 
seed for each negotiation is unique, the nonces involved in the OC link are also used as 
the input of the key seed generating function, as shown in Figure 4.9. After the OC link 
establishment, the nonces are not necessary as the channel has been isolated from 
potential attacks. However, if the renewal rate of the D-H exchange is slow, nonces can 
be used to add freshness to the generation of the key seed. 
 
The OC link ID is a unique random number generated for an entity marking a 
specific OC link. It represents the ID of the entity on the OC link and is used for key 
material generation. After the OC link is established, the OC link ID only has the local 
meaning. It operates like an index of different OC links with different settings. By 
checking the OC link ID, the entity selects stored negotiated parameters to reconstruct 
the OC link until the link is terminated. This simplifies the procedure of OC 
redistribution/reconstruction, and is quite important for the packet switching network. 
 
4.2.8 Retransmission 
 
Since the initiation of the OC link required random information from both entities, 
a complete negotiation must consist of request/response pairs. Thus the responder only 
sends the response when a request is received. Therefore, the initiator is responsible for 
retransmission in the event of a timeout, and has to cache every request sent until it gets 
the response. On the other side, the responder has to cache each response until it 
receives a request whose packet sequence number is larger than the sequence number in 
the response plus its window size. After the OC link is established, each entity has the 
authority to initiate the request. While the request is being sent, unless a window size 
notification is received, the requestor has to wait for a response to each of its requests. 
Once a window size notification is received, the requestor is allowed to send multiple 
requests within the window. In other words, if the responder stated its window size is N, 
then when the initiator needs to make a request X, it MUST wait until it has received 
responses to all requests up through request X-N. If the window size supported is larger 
than one, the entity is required to process incoming requests out of order, since the 
arrival time of the requests in the same window is unpredictable. 
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4.3 Definition of Data Formats in OCSP 
 
In this section, all the related data formats in the proposed optical coding security 
protocol are defined. It is the first time that we have a well-defined protocol to make our 
experimental setup more suitable for the practical applications. In the previous work, the 
data confidentiality which is guaranteed by the reconfigurable optical coding is the only 
thing we considered. However, in this new proposed protocol, the identity 
authentication, the data integrity checksum and the distribution of the dynamic optical 
codes are also included. Each security feature can be achieved by a separate module and 
operates together as long as the data is in the designed format. To maintain the 
flexibility of the protocol, each security module is designed in similar structure and 
contains all the information that have to share between the entities involved in the 
communication. It should be noted that the proposed optical code security protocol is 
complete original. However, various open source algorithms are included as the 
supplements. 
 
4.3.1 Optical Code Link Header 
 
 
Figure 4.13   Format of the OC link header. 
 
The format of the OC link header is shown in Figure 4.13. 
 
• OC link ID (OLID): 8 octets, a value chosen by the entity to identify a specific 
OC link. The requestor’s OLID is never zero while in the first request for OC link 
initiation, but the responder’s OLID is left as zero. After the responder has received this 
request, a unique random value is generated and used as an OLID. 
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• NP (1 octet): Indicates the following type of module (1~255). 
OC Link Module:  b10000000 
OC Link Renewal Module b11000000 
D-H Module:   b01000000 
IDq:     b00100000 
IDs:    b00010000 
Authentication Module:  b00001000 
Authentication Req:   b00000100 
Integrity check Module:  b00000010 
Nonce:    b00000001 
End:     b00000000 
 
• P.Type (1 octet): Indicates the type of current payload. 
OC link initiation:   b00100000 
Identity Authentication:  b00000100 
Data transmission:  b00000000 
 
• tg (1 octet): Guard time of OC generation 
 
The speed of the D-H algorithm is highly related to the environment, Diffie-
Hellman groups and the length of p. For the 1024 bit ECDH group which can provide 
perfect forward secrecy in SSL/TLS, the operation per second is over 12000 [96]. 
 
A useful fact is that if we double the length of the D-H group, the operation we 
need increases by four times. Hence for a 32 bit ECDH group, the processing time is 
~80 ns, which is equivalent to a packet rate ~12 Mpacket/s. However, since the 
responder gets all the information to generate the OC before he sends the response to 
the requestor, the setting of the guard time may be irrelevant to the time for the D-H 
exchange. In this case, the guard time equals to the overall time for synchronization 
signal processing. 
 
• q/s (1 octet): Identifies the type of message. 
Request:   b01000000 
Response:   b00000010 
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• Packet ID (4 octets): Monotonically increased packet sequence, used for 
matching the requests and responses, controlling retransmission and preventing replay 
attacks. 
 
• Length of Packet (4 octets): The total length of the OC link initiation message, 
including the OC link header and the total length of payload. 
 
• Synchronization Signal (4 octets): A sequence of data “1” to provide a clock 
reference signal to the OC decoder. 
 
4.3.2 Module Header 
 
Each module of OCSP has the same header format, shown in Figure 4.14. 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Format of the module header. 
 
The module header provides the basic controlling information of a module: the 
next type of payload (see 4.3.1) and the length of the current module including the 
module header and the payload. Each module contains a module header, which indicates 
the next operation and where it starts. 
 
4.3.3 Optical Code Link Module 
  
 
Figure 4.15 Format of the OC link module. 
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Each module consists of a module header and the payload. The payload of the OC 
link module includes the type of payload, the generation algorithm of OC, the chip rate 
of the OC link and the length of OC, which are defined as follows: 
 
M_Type: Shares the same definition with NP, indicates the type of current module. 
 
For the OC link module, the algorithm selector is defined as: 
PRF_HMAC_MD5  b000000000000001 
PRF_HMAC_SHA1  b000000000001000 
PRF_HMAC_SHA256 b0000000100000000 
PRF_USER_DEFINED bXXXX000000000000 
The default algorithms used for OC generation are MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 hash 
function, which are widely used for random number generation. However, users are 
allowed to define their own PRF function either by software or hardware. 
 
The OC_Chip rate is defined as any multiple of bit rate. The highest chip rate 
supported by 16 bits is sufficient for any application. 
 
OC_Length is the required length of the OC. Technically, the OC_Length can be 
set to any value, however it is suggested to be set at over 1024 bit against potential 
brute-force attacks. 
 
4.3.4 Diffie-Hellman Exchange Module 
  
 
Figure 4.16 Format of the D-H exchange module. 
 
The algorithm selector is defined as: 
 768 bit MODP D-H Group  b0000000000000001 
 1024 bit MODP D-H Group  b0000000000000010 
 1536-bit MODP D-H Group  b0000000000000100 
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 2048-bit MODP D-H Group  b0000000000001000 
 3072-bit MODP D-H Group  b0000000000010000 
 4096-bit MODP D-H Group  b0000000000100000 
 6144-bit MODP D-H Group  b0000000001000000 
 8192-bit MODP D-H Group  b0000000010000000 
 
The details of the above algorithms are defined in [91]. The key length is actually 
included in the algorithm selector. However, to construct a general format, it is required 
to be declared independently. 
 
4.3.5 Authentication Module 
 
As shown in the previous section, the identity authentication happens after the OC 
link is established. It starts from a CERTReq segment and ends with the exchange of the 
CERT segment. The formats of CERTReq and CERT are shown in Figure 4.17 and 
Figure 4.18, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.17 Format of the CERTReq segment. 
 
The algorithm selector is defined as: 
 PKCS#1 [97]     d1 
 ECDSA [98]     d2 
 EIGamal Signature [99]   d3 
 X.509 Certificate – Signature [100]  d4 
 PGP Certificate [101]    d5 
 Kerberos Token [102]    d6 
 SPKI Certificate [103]   d7 
 Hash and URL of X.509 certificate [104] d8 
 Reserved/User Defined   d9-65535 
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The authentication algorithms listed above are the most widely used algorithms and 
the protocol can be extended by the user. 
 
The Authentication Server ID-Public key field contains an indicator of trusted AS, 
which consists of the corresponding ID and public key. 
 
Figure 4.18 Format of the CERT segment. 
Digital Signature is a variable length field filled with a signed certificate. 
 
4.3.6 Integrity Checking Module 
 
The format of the integrity checking module (data authentication) is shown in 
Figure 4.17. 
  
 
Figure 4.19 Format of the IC segment. 
 
The algorithm selector is defined as: 
 IC_HMAC_MD5_96 [105]   d1 
 IC_HMAC_SHA1_96 [106]   d2 
 IC_AES_XCBC_96 [107]   d3 
 Reserved/User Defined   d4-65535 
The default algorithms provide a degree of certificate function along with simple 
checksum. The simpler checksum such as BSD checksum could also be deployed since 
the OC link has already provided the protection on the data transmitted. 
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4.3.7 Data Transmission Module 
 
The data transmission module simply consists of a module header and the data 
payload, as shown in Figure 5.20. 
  
 
Figure 4.20  Format of the data transmission module. 
 
The confidentiality of the data is related to the length of the data. If the length of 
the data is the same as the length of the OC, “one-time pad” can be achieved. If the 
length of the data is much longer than the length of the OC, then there is a risk that the 
eavesdropper could get the information without the knowledge of the OC, explained in 
section 4.4.2. 
 
4.3.8 OC Link Renewal Module 
 
The format of the OC link renewal module is defined as shown in Figure 4.21. 
  
 
Figure 4.21  Format of the OC link renewal module. 
 
The module consists of parameters of the D-H group and the new D-H public value. 
The only difference in the algorithm selector is, when the value is set to 0, a random 
sequence with required length is generated instead of the D-H public value, the value of 
which is used for key material generation. 
 
0 32/ bit8 16 24
NP Length of PayloadReserved
Data
~ ~
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The algorithm selector is defined as the same as the D-H exchange module with an 
additional definition about no D-H exchange being needed: 
 Direct exchange: b0000000000000000 
 
4.3.9 D-H Exchange Segment 
 
The D-H exchange segment is used to exchange the D-H public value between the 
requestor and the responder. The format is shown in Figure 4.22. 
  
 
Figure 4.22  Format of the D-H segment. 
 
The length of the D-H public value is equal to the length of the requested D-H 
group. If the request group is rejected by the responder, an acceptable option is sent 
back from the responder enabling the requestor to start a new initiation request. The 
generation of the D-H public value is introduced in section 4.2.2. 
 
4.3.10 ID Segment 
 
The ID segment is used to imply the identity of the entity. It is suggested that each 
message contains two IDs: IDi (identity of requestor) and IDr (identity of expecting 
responder). The format of the ID segment is shown in Figure 4.23. 
  
 
Figure 4.23 Format of the ID segment. 
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ID type is defined as: 
 
 ID_IPv4_Address  d1 
 ID_IPv6_Address  d2 
 ID_MAC_Address  d3 
 ID_Authorised_ID  d4 
 
The ID can be the IP or the physical address of the entity, and the specific identity 
issued by the network operator. ID data segment is the value of the selected ID type. 
 
 
4.3.11 Nonce Segment 
 
The Nonce segment contains random data that is used to guarantee the uniqueness 
of the message. It is also used to generate the unique key materials that correspond to 
the current session. The format is shown in Figure. 4.24. 
 
Figure 4.24  Format of Nonce segment. 
 
Since the Nonce of both entities is used for key materials generation, the length of 
each Nonce is no less than half the length of the negotiated D-H Group length. Section 
4.2.7 gives the explanation on how to generate the nonce data. 
 
4.4 Security Consideration from Cryptanalysis Perspective 
 
The major motivation of OCSP is to design a protocol that allows the data 
transmitted on a dynamic OC link to overcome the vulnerabilities of static OC schemes 
(M-ary modulation or OC aggregation for example). In cryptography, the information-
theoretic secrecy is usually considered as a bonus and it is usually assumed that the 
attacker can obtain the information (especially encrypted) without error. Therefore, in 
this section, we analyse several attacking scenarios from the cryptanalysis perspective 
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without considering physical layer security. The results can be a good supplement to the 
secrecy provided in the optical layer. The scenarios are listed as follows. 
 
4.4.1 Ciphertext-only Attack: Parallel Exhaustive OC Searching 
 
One straightforward attack method against static OC schemes is the parallel 
exhaustive OC searching attack, as shown in Figure 4.25. 
  
 
Figure 4.25  Parallel exhaustive OC searching. 
 
When the length of OC is limited and used repeatedly, the eavesdropper can 
perform multiple exhaustive OC searching attacks in parallel simultaneously. Since the 
OC patterns are fixed, eventually the eavesdropper will get a good autocorrelation at 
each arm. Hence the total OC pattern can be determined and used for matched decoding. 
 
The feasibility of the attack scheme depends on the average time spent cracking 
each OC, the optical buffer’s ability to retain certain encoded signals and the lifetime of 
the OC. The first parameter is inversely proportional to the code space and the second 
parameter is determined by the ability of the optical buffer, while the last parameter is 
quite robust. 
 
In traditional static OC schemes, the code space is fixed when the 
encoding/decoding device is selected, and the code reconfiguration operation usually 
involves delicate micro-mechanic techniques, which makes the system less flexible. In 
our reconfigurable OC coding scheme with OCSP, we provide a feasible way to 
generate ultra-long OC and in the meantime a reliable way to control the lifetime of 
OCs. Thus, this makes the system immune to the exhaustive OC searching. 
tap coupler
OC Exhaustive 
Searching Decoder #1
OC Exhaustive 
Searching Decoder #2
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…
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4.4.2 Ciphertext-only Attack: Differential Analysis 
 
Differential analysis is a common attack on the static OC scheme and is quite 
effective, especially when the signal is binary modulated by OC, as shown in Figure 
4.26. 
  
 
Figure 4.26  Schematic of a simple differential detector. 
 
Instead of trying to extract the OC information, the scheme is designed to identify 
the differences between the code patterns. The feasibility of the scheme is inversely 
proportional to the number of codes used for modulation. In traditional static OC 
schemes, the encoder and the decoder are passive devices; hence the data is usually 
modulated by the limited number of OCs, making statistical analysis of the detection 
result feasible. In our reconfigurable OC coding scheme with OCSP, the data is totally 
independent from the OC, and the OC is generated from the shared secret which is 
unknown to the eavesdropper, thus the system is completely immune to the attacks. 
 
 
4.4.3 Known Plaintext Attack: Phase Shifts Detection 
 
From the perspective of cryptography, the encoding process is quite similar to the 
simple stream cipher. Instead of doing the XOR operation bit-by-bit, the optical 
encoding process uses a random pattern specified by multiple OC sequences (4 chips in 
this example) to replace each bit. Considering the chip-level detection is naturally more 
difficult than the bit-level detection, guaranteed information-theoretic secrecy is 
provided by the encoding process. However, the similar weakness of simple XOR 
encryption should also be avoided during the system design. 
  
1 bit delay
tap
Optical null
coupler
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Figure 4.27 Weakness of simple XOR encryption. 
 
The vulnerability of simple XOR encryption is shown in Figure 4.27. As long as 
the key length is limited and reused, the attacker who knows the length of the key can 
easily perform an XOR operation on cipher text to eliminate the influences of the key. 
 
In ideal circumstances, a similar attack can be performed, as shown in Figure 5.28. 
The attacker can apply a delay line that is equal to the length of the key and then 
interfere the delayed signal with the original signal. In this way, the phase shifts induced 
by the OC will interfere destructively and will leave an interference signal caused by 
two sections of the original data. In other words, as long as the attacker knows part of 
the original data, the security of the system is compromised. Also, if he can manage to 
get enough information that is equal to the length of the OC, the security of the whole 
system is challenged. 
 
The attacking scheme is specified against our proposed scheme because the 
traditional static OC scheme does not even have the concept of the “key”. To avoid the 
attacks, we defined an OC renewal module in OCSP to realize the management on the 
lifetime of the OC. With the proper setting on the length of the OC, the system can be 
strong enough against the attacks. If we set the time duration of each OC to be equal to 
the renewal rate and the length of the seed to be no less than the length of the data 
encoded by each OC, the “one-time pad” is achieved. 
  
1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  0Data
Key Cipher text1  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  0
0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0
1  0  1  0  1
1  0  1  0  1
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Figure 4.28   Potential threats when reusing OC with limited length. 
 
Practically, due to the limitation of the optical buffer and the instability of the 
interference time of encoded signals, the scheme may not be feasible. However, it is still 
suggested to deploy a long OC with ephemeral D-H exchange to achieve perfect 
forward secrecy. 
 
4.4.4 Chosen Plaintext Attack: Reconstruct the Transfer Function 
 
A chosen plaintext attack is a very strong attack model that assumes the attacker 
can obtain ciphertext for arbitrary plaintext. The condition, at first glance, is an 
unrealistic model. However, in some special cases, the scheme may become feasible, for 
example, if the attacker manages to access the encoder physically. In this situation, the 
attack is feasible for static code schemes. Since the passive encoder is an LTI 
component, the attacker can get the output signals to correspond to any combination of 
inputs. Therefore, a mimic encoder can be synthesized by reconstructing the transfer 
function of the encoder. However, since the encoder in our scheme is an active encoder 
and the lifetime of the OC is session bounded, the attack is completely infeasible. 
 
Besides these attacks, the strength of the encryptions applied in OCSP also affects 
the overall security performance. The most important is the strength of the D-H 
exchange because it is the only information transmitted outside of the protection of the 
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OC link and is used for OC link establishment. For security purposes, there are several 
security applications whose structure and algorithm are not fully public. On the contrary, 
in our OCSP, the security that is enabled by a dynamic OC link is fully transparent and 
stays in the physical layer rather than an obscure algorithm. Any user who adopts the 
OCSP can configure every detail of the system at their own demand, including selecting 
trustworthy algorithms, selecting required D-H groups, defining the type of OC and the 
chip rate. As long as the OC generation function is trustworthy and the outputs of which 
have high entropy, security can be guaranteed. 
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Chapter 5   Conclusion and Future Work 
 
The security features of the coherent optical security communication systems 
enabled by optical coding techniques have been analysed in the thesis. Both the merits 
and the limitations of the temporal phase coding schemes and spectral phase coding 
schemes are addressed. The wiretap channel model for the optical coding schemes has 
been analysed and a brief equation, which can be used to evaluate the information-
theoretic security level of the all kinds of optical coding channels, has been derived 
from information theory. 
 
For our proposed reconfigurable optical coding device, a compatible security 
protocol has been drafted for the first time, which has been referred to as optical coding 
security protocol in the thesis. The protocol contains the guidance of optical code 
distribution, authentication through digital signature and the definition of all the security 
modules in the consideration. The protocol is designed to be extensible and can be 
configured on the specific demand. The encryption algorithms included are all open 
sources and trusted. It is believed that the use of the dynamic optical code to encrypt the 
signal will make the traditional cryptanalysis infeasible. Thus the security of the system 
can be guaranteed. The work in the thesis is still a preliminary result and can be further 
researched: 
 
The system models that used in security evaluation are ideal models. In practice, 
the impairment of the device will induce much more noises than the thermal noise and 
the shot noise. Hence the result may be slightly different from the ideal case. However, 
the principle of the calculation is simple enough to be applied to any wiretap channel 
model. The security of the reconfigurable coding device can be proved by the 
information theory, yet the demonstration hasn’t been done. In consideration of the 
compatibility, the proposed protocol has a redundant data structure. The size of the 
whole protocol could be reduced when the deployment environment is constant. 
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